120 F. Supp. 3d 178
D. Conn.2015Background
- In April 2014 the City of New Haven temporarily transferred firefighter Michael Briscoe to Director of Public Safety Communications after settling his earlier Title VII litigation; Local 825 (the union) filed a quo warranto action in Connecticut Superior Court seeking Briscoe’s ouster.
- Briscoe removed the state-court quo warranto action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1), alleging the Union filed the action in retaliatory response to his prior race-discrimination litigation (invoking Title VII § 2000e-3 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
- Local 825 moved to remand; the district court addressed (1) whether Briscoe invoked a federal right within § 1443(1)’s scope, and (2) whether he would be “denied or cannot enforce” that right in Connecticut courts.
- The court found Briscoe adequately pleaded a colorable Title VII retaliation claim against the union (first prong satisfied) because unions can be liable under § 2000e-3 for retaliatory conduct toward members.
- The court rejected Briscoe’s § 1981-based removal theory, concluding § 1981 requires a claim that impairs a specific contractual relationship (the complaint did not plausibly tie the quo warranto challenge to an enforceable contract right of Briscoe under the CBA).
- The court concluded Connecticut quo warranto practice—statutorily excluding quo warranto from the merger of law and equity and precedent limiting quo warranto to the officeholder’s de jure right—would prevent Briscoe from using a Title VII equitable defense to block ouster, satisfying § 1443(1)’s second prong; remand was denied and a federal evidentiary hearing ordered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the removal satisfies § 1443(1)’s first prong (federal right) | Briscoe: union retaliation violates Title VII § 2000e-3 and § 1981; both are "laws providing for equal civil rights" | Local 825: Title VII applies only to employers; union is not Briscoe’s employer; § 1981 doesn't reach this conduct | Court: Title VII § 2000e-3 plausibly applies to unions; first prong satisfied for Title VII claim; § 1981 claim not sufficiently pleaded |
| Whether Title VII authorizes a retaliation claim against a union for filing quo warranto | Briscoe: filing the quo warranto was retaliatory, disadvantaged him, and causally linked to his protected activity | Local 825: filing challenged valid contractual/charter violations; motive is lawful protection of members and CBA rights | Court: Allegations sufficiently plead the elements of Title VII retaliation; a colorable federal defense exists |
| Whether § 1981 supports removal based on alleged retaliation | Briscoe: his rights under the collective bargaining agreement are contract-related and § 1981 protects him from retaliation | Local 825: Domino’s requires plaintiff to identify an impaired contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant; Briscoe lacks such a contract | Court: Applying Domino’s and CBOCS, Briscoe failed to show a cognizable § 1981 claim tied to a specific contractual relationship; § 1981 removal denied |
| Whether Connecticut quo warranto practice denies Briscoe the ability to enforce his federal Title VII right in state court (second prong) | Briscoe: quo warranto is at law (excluded from merger with equity); state procedure would bar equitable Title VII defenses, so he "cannot enforce" his rights there | Local 825: state court can hear counterclaims and award damages; motive won’t affect quo warranto remedy; state judge can consider related claims | Court: Connecticut precedent/statutes limit quo warranto to de jure title issues and exclude equitable defenses; this effectively prevents using Title VII to bar ouster — second prong satisfied; remand denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (background litigation concerning 2003 promotion exams and subsequent promotions)
- Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975) (articulates § 1443(1) two‑prong test)
- City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (limits § 1443(1) to statutes providing equal civil rights)
- Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (permits removal where state prosecution itself denies federally protected civil rights)
- Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (§ 1981 requires identification of an impaired contractual relationship)
- CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (§ 1981 can encompass retaliation claims in a contract‑related context)
- Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (union liability for retaliation against members under Title VII)
- Emigrant Sav. Bank v. Elan Mgmt. Corp., 668 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1982) (§ 1443(1) analysis and limits on removal where state courts can enforce federal rights)