Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring, Inc., 13 A.3d 1227

Petitioner Neustadter, an Orthodox Jew, sought two-day trial postponements to observe Shavuot during a scheduled civil malpractice trial.
The circuit court set a February 11, 2008, start date; subsequent rescheduling began June 2, 2008, with trial to run nine days.
Petitioner filed multiple motions (May 6, May 19, and June 2–3, 2008) seeking relief from appearing June 9–10, 2008 for religious reasons.
The trial proceeded in Petitioner's absence on June 9–10, 2008; Holy Cross presented its case in full other than Neustadter.
Jurors were not sequestered and the defense witnesses were cross-examined after Neustadter returned to court.
The jury returned a verdict for Holy Cross; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, and the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying two-day religious accommodations.	Neustadter argues denials violated his religious freedom.	HolCy Cross contends rulings were within trial court discretion.	Yes, abuse of discretion; remand for new trial.
Whether absence of Neustadter vitiated his right to be present at trial.	Absence prejudicially infringed presence rights.	Trial can proceed with witnesses and evidence.	Presumed prejudice; reversal required.
Whether the denial was a neutral, generally applicable action or an individualized assessment requiring Sherbert/strict scrutiny.	Action targeted religious conduct; required strict scrutiny.	Action was neutral and generally applicable.	Court treated as neutral; but still reversed on abuse-of-discretion grounds.
What standard of review applies to continuance denials in civil cases involving religious observances.	Abuse-of-discretion standard should apply due to substantial burden.	Standard is abuse-of-discretion, with deference to court.	Abuse-of-discretion standard applies; decision still reversed.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (established substantial burden test historically, later narrowed by Smith)
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral, generally applicable laws need not be strictly scrutinized)
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (strict scrutiny for nonneutral or not generally applicable laws)
Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 407 Md. 53 (2008) (RLUIPA-substantial burden analysis applied by Maryland court)
Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211 (2002) (abuse-of-discretion standard in review of trial rulings)
Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654 (2006) (continues discretion of trial court to control docket; abuse standard)
Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15 (1974) (continuance decisions generally within trial court discretion)
Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608 (1919) (early guidance on continuance necessity)
Reaser v. Reaser, 62 Md.App. 643 (1985) (illustrates when postponement in complex matters is warranted)
In re McNeil, 21 Md.App. 484 (1974) (precedent on balancing delays and interests in custody contexts)