Neumann v. Liles
261 Or. App. 567
Or. Ct. App.2014Background
- Dancing Deer Mountain, a wedding venue co-owned by Neumann and Benton, was the subject of a negative Google review by Liles after a wedding.
- The review labeled Neumann as “two faced, crooked, and rude,” claimed she and Benton changed rules, and alleged efforts to keep deposits and charge more.
- Plaintiffs sued for defamation and false light; Dancing Deer Mountain also asserted intentional interference with economic relations and false light claims.
- Liles moved to strike under ORS 31.150, arguing the review and conduct fell within anti‑SLAPP protections.
- The trial court granted the motion to strike, dismissing all claims without prejudice and awarding fees; on appeal, the court reversed as to Neumann’s defamation claim, with other claims left for remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the anti‑SLAPP statute applies to the online review | Neumann contends the claims aren’t within ORS 31.150(2) scope. | Liles argues the review falls within protected activities under ORS 31.150(2)(c)–(d). | The court affirmed subject-matter scope and reversed on defamation. |
| Whether Neumann established a prima facie defamation case | Neumann presented evidence that the statements were false and harmed her professional reputation. | Liles argued the statements were nonactionable opinions or hyperbole and/or protected by privilege. | The court held Neumann met the prima facie standard for defamation; this portion of the grant of the anti‑SLAPP motion was reversed. |
| Whether statements were defamatory per se or required proof of special harm | Defamatory statements about Neumann’s conduct and honesty harmed her professional standing and business. | Statements were either nonactionable opinion or did not amount to per se defamation. | Defamatory per se finding supported; despite malice questions, evidence suggested special harm could be inferred. |
| Whether privilege or malice defenses defeat prima facie claim | Privilege and lack of malice arguments do not defeat prima facie defamation at this stage. | Qualified privilege and malice defenses could bar recovery, as appropriate. | Not resolved at this stage; court found defendant’s privilege defense insufficient to defeat prima facie defamation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Davis, 259 Or. App. 497 (2013) (two-step anti-SLAPP framework; low bar to survive dismissal)
- Staten v. Steel, 222 Or. App. 17 (2008) (SLAPP context; expeditious dismissal aims)
- National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Starplex Corp., 220 Or. App. 560 (2008) (per se defamation and harm)
- Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or. App. 103 (1996) (opinion vs. fact in defamation analysis)
- Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99 (1979) (reader understanding standard for defamation)
- Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or. 434 (1985) (public figure concept and non‑media liability)
- Page v. Parsons, 249 Or. App. 445 (2012) (Oregon‑California influence on ORS 31.150 interpretation)
- Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13 (2007) (Cal. defamation scope; public interest)
- Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883 (2004) (defamation—opinion vs. fact nuance)
- ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993 (2001) (defamation—context of statements)