2015 IL App (3d) 140775
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Neufairfield Homeowners Association (NHOA) recorded covenants in 2004 restricting lots to single-family dwellings but allowing certain "personal businesses" under §3.12 if conducted within the residence and not barred by city ordinances; §3.13 prohibits "other commercial activities" that would allow customers or the public to frequent the property.
- Melissa Wagner and Denise Gurley each operate state‑licensed, home‑based daycare centers from residences in the subdivision (Wagner: up to 7 children; Gurley: up to 8), operating weekdays with pickup/drop‑off traffic.
- Both daycares were confirmed by the City of Joliet to require no special use permits and not to violate city ordinances.
- NHOA sued both homeowners seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the daycares generated "frequent" commercial traffic in violation of §3.13 despite compliance with §3.12.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; affidavits showed number of children and vehicle traffic, while NHOA submitted homeowner complaints alleging multiple cars arriving/departing morning and evening.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding the daycare traffic was not the kind of "frequent" commercial activity prohibited by §3.13; NHOA appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants’ home daycares violate §3.13 by causing customers/the public to "frequent" the property | Traffic generated (multiple cars morning/evening) constitutes "frequent" commercial activity prohibited by §3.13 | Daycares meet §3.12 personal‑business exceptions, comply with city law, and the limited daily vehicles do not amount to "frequent" public commercial traffic | Court held traffic (few cars AM/PM for small licensed daycares) is not "frequent" commercial activity; summary judgment for defendants affirmed |
| Whether a factual hearing was required on the meaning of "frequent" | NHOA: dispute over intensity/volume of traffic creates a genuine issue of material fact | Defendants: facts undisputed; legal interpretation of "frequent" is appropriate as matter of law | Court held no evidentiary hearing needed—term "frequent" interpreted as matter of law given undisputed facts |
| Whether §3.13 applies to uses permitted by §3.12 | NHOA: §3.13 captures activities that, though allowed under §3.12, result in public frequenting and therefore must cease | Defendants: §3.12 expressly allows home‑based personal businesses; §3.13 addresses other commercial activities not within §3.12 | Court held §3.13 is intended to cover commercial activities other than the personal businesses allowed by §3.12, so it does not apply to these daycares |
Key Cases Cited
- Levitt Homes, Inc. v. Old Farm Homeowners’ Ass’n, 111 Ill. App. 3d 300 (1982) (restrictive covenants enforced according to plain language; construed against developer)
- Forest Glen Community Homeowners Ass’n v. Nolan, 104 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1982) (court’s goal is to give effect to parties’ intent; HOA may interpret covenants but not ignore express language)
- Fairways of Country Lakes Townhouse Ass’n v. Shenandoah Development Corp., 113 Ill. App. 3d 932 (1983) (covenants strictly construed in favor of free use of property)
- Bailey v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 405 Ill. App. 3d 550 (2010) (dictionary may be used to determine ordinary meaning of undefined terms in statutes or covenants)
- Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill. App. 3d 618 (2007) (summary judgment burdens and standards)
- Schrager v. North Community Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3d 696 (2002) (summary judgment’s purpose is to determine existence of triable issue of fact)