NETCHOICE LLC v. MOODY, 546 F.Supp.3d 1082

Background

Plaintiffs: NetChoice, LLC and Computer & Communications Industry Association, trade associations suing on behalf of affected social‑media members challenging Florida Senate Bill 7072 (creates Fla. Stat. §§ 106.072, 287.137, 501.2041).
Defendants: Florida Attorney General, Florida Elections Commission members, and a Deputy Secretary of Florida DMS (official‑capacity defendants; Ex parte Young invoked for prospective relief).
Key challenged rules: ban on deplatforming candidates (§106.072); prohibitions on algorithmic post‑prioritization/shadow‑banning for content “by or about” candidates, special protections for large “journalistic enterprises,” mandatory publication/applicability rules, disclosure/notice/opt‑out requirements, and a selective exemption for platforms owned with large Florida theme parks (§501.2041).
Claims: First Amendment (compelled/forbidden editorial speech, viewpoint discrimination), Vagueness (due process), Equal Protection (speaker/size and theme‑park exemptions), Dormant Commerce Clause, and preemption by 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Procedural posture and relief: Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction; court found plaintiffs likely to succeed on §230 preemption and First Amendment claims and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of §§106.072 and 501.2041 as to the defendants (effective upon $1,000 security).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preemption under 47 U.S.C. § 230	Florida provisions impose liability for good‑faith content moderation (e.g., deplatforming), so they are preempted.	§230 does not bar state regulation here or is distinguishable.	Court: §230(c)(2) protects good‑faith content moderation and §230(e)(3) preempts state laws that impose liability for such moderation; plaintiffs likely to prevail on preemption for removal/restriction provisions.
First Amendment — compelled/forbidden editorial speech and viewpoint discrimination	Statutes force platforms to host speech, forbid certain platform speech, and were motivated by hostility to perceived viewpoints; violate editorial freedom.	State treats platforms as more like common carriers or regulating conduct (not speech); statutes are permissible balancing measures.	Court: statutes are content‑ and viewpoint‑based, trigger strict scrutiny, and fail; plaintiffs likely to prevail on First Amendment claims.
Discrimination among speakers (size and theme‑park exemption)	Selective application to very large platforms and explicit exemptions for theme‑park–owned platforms is speaker discrimination and evidences content/viewpoint motives.	Targeting large platforms is a permissible tailoring to address scale; exemptions are legislative judgment.	Court: discrimination among speakers triggers strict scrutiny; exemption cannot be justified and confirms illegal speaker‑based discrimination.
Vagueness (e.g., "about" a candidate; "consistent manner")	Statute contains pervasive imprecision and internal inconsistencies, raising heightened First Amendment vagueness concerns.	Ambiguities can be resolved by judicial construction; not fatal.	Court: statute is riddled with ambiguity; vagueness is a substantial concern given First Amendment stakes though court declined to rest injunction solely on vagueness.
Irreparable harm & injunction prerequisites	Platforms will be compelled or prohibited from exercising editorial judgment — irreparable First Amendment injury; balance of harms/public interest favors injunction.	State argued public interests support enforcement; injunction would cause harm.	Court: plaintiffs established irreparable injury, balance of harms and public interest support preliminary relief.

Key Cases Cited

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (associational standing principles)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (official‑capacity suits for prospective relief)
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.) (purpose of §230 to protect moderation)
Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66 (2d Cir.) (§230 protects good‑faith content moderation and preempts inconsistent state law)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (Internet speech receives full First Amendment protection)
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (compelled publication violates the First Amendment)
Hurley v. Irish‑American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (private speaker’s right to exclude relates to editorial judgment)
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (compelled inclusion of opposing viewpoint violated speech rights)
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (compelled access to private forums may be permissible when not compelling speech)
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (state law can require access to private property for speech without abridging owner’s speech in some contexts)
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (government may not restrict funding or speech based on viewpoint)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (content‑based speech restrictions trigger strict scrutiny)