74 F. Supp. 3d 1366
D. Colo.2014Background
- Ms. Nesbitt filed a class wage-and-hour action under FLSA and state laws on April 7, 2014, against Steiner Education Group entities.
- Plaintiff alleges students performed massages for paying public without compensation, creating an employment relationship under FLSA and state laws.
- Nesbitt signed an Enrollment Agreement containing a broad Arbitration Agreement for all disputes arising with SEG and affiliates, including formation and enforcement of the arbitration clause.
- Arbitration provisions include AAA Commercial Rules, FAA governing, cost-shifting provisions, and a bold warning about rights waived by arbitration.
- Arbitration also contains a right-to-reject provision allowing opt-out within 30 days of enrollment, but Nesbitt did not opt out within that period.
- Defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings; Nesbitt opposed, arguing the agreement is unenforceable on unconscionability, statutory-vindication, and NLRA grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable under Colorado law? | Nesbitt argues procedural and substantive unconscionability under the Davis factors. | Defendants contend the agreement is a standard adhesion contract with fair notice and options, not unconscionable. | Arbitration Agreement is not procedurally unconscionable; thus not unconscionable overall. |
| Do the Commercial Rules costs and unilateral costs to Nesbitt prevent effective vindication of statutory rights under the FAA and FLSA? | Commercial Rules costs and each-party bearing own counsel costs preclude Nesbitt from pursuing her statutory rights; no savings clause. | Costs may be recoverable under arbitration rules; savings clause not explicit. | Provisions requiring Nesbitt to bear arbitration costs and fee-shifting are unenforceable and cannot be severed to save the agreement. |
| Does the arbitration clause violate the NLRA by foreclosing access to a judicial forum for statutory rights? | Clause broadly restricts rights and could deter filing under NLRA; argues the clause is moot after other grounds. | Not addressed separately if other grounds render the agreement unenforceable; otherwise not necessarily NLRA-violative. | NLRA argument moot because other grounds render the arbitration clause unenforceable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (Supreme Court 2006) (FAA validity and enforceability; questions of contract defenses to arbitration)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 1983) (liberal policy favoring arbitration)
- Rent-A-Center, W. Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (Supreme Court 2010) (arbitration as matter of contract; no discretion by court on arbitrability when agreement exists)
- Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (Supreme Court 1985) (statutory issues to be arbitrated per FAA)
- Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (arbitration costs can render forum inaccessible; affects statutory rights)
- Am. Express Co. v. Italian Restaurateur, 570 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court 2013) (arbitration clauses cannot prospectively waive statutory remedies)
- Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (Supreme Court 2011) (limits of arbitration under saving clause; general policy in favor of arbitration)
- Gourley v. Yellow Transp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Colo. 2001) (unconscionability and fee provisions in arbitration agreements; severability discussed)
- Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.3d 985 (Colo. 1986) (Colorado Davis factors for unconscionability)
- Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Colo. 2011) (Davis factors; unconscionability analysis in Colorado context)
- Awbrey v. Pennzoil Co., 961 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1992) (binding authority on severability and unconscionable provisions in arbitration)
