1:16-cv-01288
D. Md.Aug 23, 2018Background
- On April 12, 2015 Freddie Gray died after being transported in a Baltimore police wagon; six officers were charged in connection with his death. Gray was initially not injured at arrest but later became unresponsive and died of a spinal injury.
- Major Samuel Cogen signed an Application for Statement of Charges and probable cause affidavits for the six officers; State's Attorney Marilyn Mosby read the application verbatim at a press conference announcing charges.
- Criminal proceedings against the officers ended without convictions (acquittals, hung jury, and dismissals). Five officers sued Mosby, Cogen, and the State asserting claims including § 1983 malicious prosecution, state malicious prosecution, defamation, and false light; the cases were consolidated.
- This Court previously dismissed many claims; the Fourth Circuit reversed certain claims against Mosby on absolute prosecutorial immunity and found Mosby entitled to MTCA immunity for press-conference torts in Nero v. Mosby.
- After Nero, Cogen moved to dismiss the remaining claims against him: § 1983 malicious prosecution, state-law malicious prosecution, defamation, and false light. The Court granted Cogen’s renewed motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether probable cause was lacking for charges (§ 1983 malicious prosecution) | Application contained false statements/omissions and no probable cause | Fourth Circuit’s Nero indicates the Application was supported by probable cause | Dismissed — probable cause existed or allegations do not plausibly negate it |
| Whether Cogen acted with malice/gross negligence (state MTCA immunity) | Malice/gross negligence can be inferred from lack of probable cause and alleged omissions | Cogen acted within scope of duties and without malice or gross negligence; MTCA shields him | Dismissed — MTCA immunity applies; no plausible malice/gross negligence alleged |
| Whether Cogen violated clearly established federal law (qualified immunity) | Conduct was unreasonable and not protected | Cogen is entitled to qualified immunity for objectively reasonable reliance on the Application and Mosby’s advice | Dismissed — qualified immunity applies at pleading stage |
| Defamation / False light based on the Application | Written Application (and Mosby’s repetition) published false statements and caused reputational harm | Statements were not shown false or recklessly made; public-official standards apply; MTCA bars such torts | Dismissed — no actual malice or gross negligence; failure to plead requisite elements |
Key Cases Cited
- Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 2018) (Fourth Circuit analysis of probable cause, MTCA, and prosecutorial immunity in Gray prosecutions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard — conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework and permissive sequencing of prongs)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (actual malice standard for public-official defamation)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause as totality-of-the-circumstances, probability standard)
- Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2000) (§ 1983 malicious prosecution framework)
- Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 1998) (probable cause definition for arrests)
- Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (objective reasonableness in qualified immunity context)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (qualified immunity is an immunity from suit)