Nelssen v. Ritchie, 934 N.W.2d 377

Nelssen obtained a default money judgment against Ritchie in 1996 for $200,000 plus 6% interest; she did not execute on it immediately.
Ritchie made periodic payments to Nelssen from 1996 through 2017 (Nelssen claims about $132,300 in payments), and Nelssen agreed not to execute while payments continued.
Neb. law provides a judgment becomes dormant if not executed within 5 years and dormant judgments must be revived within 10 years after dormancy.
Nelssen filed a motion for revivor in 2018; Ritchie argued the judgment became dormant in 2001 and the 10-year revival window expired in 2011.
The district court held (1) partial payments do not toll the revivor deadline under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-216 because rights now rest on the judgment, not the original contract, and (2) Nelssen failed to prove equitable estoppel or waiver; the court overruled the revivor motion.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the revival deadline expired and Nelssen failed to show tolling, estoppel, or waiver.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nelssen)	Defendant's Argument (Ritchie)	Held
Whether post-judgment partial payments tolled the 10-year revivor deadline	Payments and an agreement not to execute tolled the revivor deadline (invoking §25-216)	§25-216 applies only to actions founded on contract; once judgment entered, rights are on the judgment and §25-216 does not toll revival	Held: No tolling — a judgment is not a "contract" for §25-216 purposes; revival deadline expired in 2011
Whether equitable estoppel or waiver bars Ritchie from asserting untimeliness	Ritchie agreed to payments and thus is estopped/waived the right to assert the revivor deadline	§25-1420 has no stated exception; even if doctrines could apply, Nelssen did not prove elements of estoppel or waiver	Held: Nelssen failed to prove estoppel or waiver; even assuming possible, record lacks evidence of Ritchie’s intent or knowledge needed to estop or show waiver

Fry v. Fry, 281 Neb. 1001 (2011) (discusses 5‑year dormancy rule for judgments)
American Nat. Bank v. Medved, 281 Neb. 799 (2011) (final judgment extinguishes original claim and substitutes rights on the judgment)
Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Merryman, 126 Neb. 684 (1934) (older discussion that revival must occur within 10 years after dormancy)
Alexanderson v. Wessman, 158 Neb. 614 (1954) (traditional application of part-payment tolling statutes to contractual causes)
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696 (Utah 1965) (policy rationale why part-payment tolling should not extend to public-record judgments)