Nelson v. State
317 Ga. App. 527
Ga. Ct. App.2012Background
- Nelson was convicted of misdemeanor homicide by vehicle in the second degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (c) after her four-year-old son A. J. was struck by a van while crossing a four-lane Austell Road at night.
- The crossing occurred outside any crosswalk; there was no crosswalk at the location, and pedestrian facilities required crossing into a distant intersection crosswalks about 50 yards away.
- Nelson carefully crossed the first two lanes with other children, then, near a median, witnesses and the driver described Nelson leading or guiding A. J. into the last two lanes where the collision occurred.
- The van driver failed to see A. J. and left the scene; A. J. died from blunt head trauma; night conditions and high speed (45 mph) were noted by investigators.
- Nelson’s trial resulted in guilty verdicts on the homicide and pedestrian crossing charges; the trial court later granted a new trial on its own motion; Nelson pursued a double jeopardy plea in bar arguing insufficiency of evidence at the prior trial.
- The appellate court upheld the jury verdicts, concluding the evidence was legally sufficient to support both the pedestrian crossing violation and the homicide by vehicle counts, and that double jeopardy did not bar retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supports the pedestrian crossing violation | Nelson contends no evidence shows unsafe entry or crossing outside a crosswalk. | Nelson argues the definition of roadway and entry timing are ambiguous; no unsafe entry proved. | Evidence supported crossing violation; jury could find unsafe entry in dark roadway. |
| Whether the homicide by vehicle second degree is proven by proximate cause | Nelson challenges causation between crossing violation and A. J.'s death. | State argues Nelson’s crossing led A. J. into the path of a vehicle, causing death. | Jury could conclude Nelson’s crossing violation played a substantial part in causing death. |
| Whether double jeopardy bars retrial after a weight-of-the-evidence grant | Nelson asserts retrial barred because evidence was legally insufficient at the prior trial. | State argues weight-of-evidence grant and subsequent denial do not amount to acquittal on insufficiency. | Double jeopardy did not bar retrial; evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ricketts v. Williams, 243 Ga. 303 (Ga. 1978) (double jeopardy depends on sufficiency after review)
- Mattox v. State, 305 Ga. App. 600 (Ga. App. 2010) (standard for sufficiency review; weigh neither credibility nor evidence)
- Guzman v. State, 262 Ga. App. 564 (Ga. App. 2003) (non-driver can be liable for vehicular homicide when involved)
- Ogilvie v. State, 313 Ga. App. 305 (Ga. App. 2011) (jury entitlement to determine accident defense resists appellate reweighing)
- Morris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 617 (Ga. App. 1993) (jury resolution on accident vs. negligence considerations)
- Bohannon v. State, 230 Ga. App. 829 (Ga. App. 1998) (parental duty to exercise reasonable care toward children)
- Scarboro v. Lauk, 133 Ga. App. 359 (Ga. App. 1974) (parental supervision and reasonable care standards)