Nelson v. 15 White Barn Drive, 517 P.3d 1062

Nelson, as trustee, owned a home with a $36,000 mortgage and ~ $200,000 market value; she feared defaulting.
Houghtalen arranged for his wife (through White Barn Drive LLC) to buy the Property for $55,000; Houghtalen received a 1% interest in White Barn.
Nelson contends she believed the transaction was a loan allowing her to repurchase the home (with a $65,000 repurchase price and rent-credit); no written option or lease was ever executed.
The parties executed a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) and a Warranty Deed transferring title; the REPC contained an integration clause and did not memorialize any repurchase option or rent-credit terms.
Nelson sued claiming the deed should be treated as an equitable mortgage and alleging fraud; the district court granted summary judgment for White Barn and Houghtalen and awarded them attorney fees; Nelson appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equitable mortgage / parol evidence	REPC and deed should be construed as a mortgage or, at least, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ contemporaneous intent (loan/repurchase) should be considered.	The REPC and Warranty Deed unambiguously memorialize a sale; the integration clause and parol evidence rule bar extrinsic terms.	REPC unambiguously reflects a sale; parol evidence excluded; summary judgment for defendants.
Fraud	Houghtalen misrepresented he would procure a private lender, hid the identity of the lender, promised a $10,000 fee and a reconveyance/repurchase; Nelson relied and was harmed.	Nelson has no evidence that any alleged representations were false or made with intent/reckless disregard; deposition reflects Nelson viewed it as a misunderstanding, not intentional fraud.	Nelson failed to produce evidence for essential fraud elements; summary judgment for defendants.
Attorney fees	Nelson: defendants are not prevailing parties if summary judgment was erroneous; Nelson also sought reciprocal fees.	REPC entitles prevailing party to attorney fees; defendants prevailed below and on appeal.	Fee award below stands; appellate fees to defendants granted; remand to calculate appellate fees.

Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984) (a deed absolute in form may be construed as a mortgage only where evidence shows it was intended as security under a parol agreement)
Glauser Storage, LLC v. Smedley, 27 P.3d 565 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (when a contemporaneous written agreement exists, courts first construe that agreement and parol evidence cannot vary an unambiguous integrated contract)
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326 (Utah 2008) (parol-evidence exceptions in equity permit extrinsic evidence where a contract is alleged to be forged, a sham, voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality)
Carlton v. Brown, 323 P.3d 571 (Utah 2014) (enumeration of the nine elements required to prove fraud)
Salo v. Tyler, 417 P.3d 581 (Utah 2018) (on summary judgment, a moving party may prevail by showing the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element)
Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (standard of review for summary judgment: view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party)
Webster v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 290 P.3d 930 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (discussed limits on relying on contemporaneous oral representations absent an argument the written contract is invalid)