NELSON, 25 I. & N. Dec. 410

Nelson, a Jamaica-born lawful permanent resident since 1994, traveled to Canada for 2 days in 2000 and returned.
He was convicted in 1999 (New York) for marijuana possession and later convicted in New Jersey in 2008 for controlled substances.
In 2008 DHS charged him as removable under 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) based on aggravated felony and drug offenses, with 1999 conviction cited as triggering the stop-time rule.
The Immigration Judge found 1999 stop-time ended his 7-year continuous residence and denied cancellation of removal for lack of continuous residence after admission.
On appeal, Nelson argues a new 7-year period began upon reentry in 2000, despite the 1999 stop-time event.
The Board dismisses the appeal, holding the stop-time rule cannot be restarted absent a waiver or other permissible mechanism.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can departure/reentry restart continuous residence under stop-time?	Nelson argues reentry in 2000 begins a new 7-year period.	Board holds stop-time ends period; clock does not restart after reentry.	No restart of continuous residence after stop-time event.
Is Mendoza-Sandino binding to restart the clock after reentry?	Supports restarting after lawful reentry following stop-time.	Mendoza-Sandino does not permit restart here due to charging document and offenses.	Mendoza-Sandino governs; clock cannot restart here.
Does Okeke support restarting the clock in this context?	Okeke could support restarting upon reentry after a clock-stopping event.	Okeke is distinguishable and not controlling; not binding.	Okeke not binding; Briseno-Flores precedent controls.
Is waiver under 212(a)(2) or related provisions available to avoid inadmissibility and restart?	Potential waiver could affect admissibility and clock restart.	No waiver or mechanism evident to restart the clock in this case.	No waiver evident; cannot restart clock.

Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (deference to Mendoza-Sandino; stop-time framework thoughtful)
Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005) (concurring opinions; distinguishable facts; binding weight limited)
Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (cited as supportive precedent on stop-time reasoning)
Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2001) (progression of stop-time interpretations across circuits)
McBride v. INS, 238 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2001) (circuit-level consistency in stop-time analysis)
Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2000) (early authority on continuous residence concepts)
Tablie v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (cites circuit perspectives on break vs. termination)
Peralta v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (analysis of continuous presence and admissibility factors)