Nelda Kellom v. Mitchell Quinn
20-1003
| 6th Cir. | Sep 3, 2021Background
- Federal task force sought Terrance Kellom on outstanding armed-robbery and weapons warrants; girlfriend told officers Kellom lived at his father’s house and had been violent.
- Officers surveilled the father’s home, observed Kellom’s car and Kellom coming and going, then entered to arrest him.
- Kellom was found in an attic, warned officers he had a gun, and attempted to flee through the attic floor with a hammer; Agent Mitchell Quinn positioned in a hallway, fired as Kellom advanced, and Kellom died.
- Plaintiffs (Kellom’s estate and family) sued asserting Bivens/Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, FTCA/state tort claims (filed administrative claim after suit), Monell municipal-liability claims, conspiracy and other state claims; district court dismissed all claims except the Bivens claim against Quinn.
- A jury found Quinn’s use of force justified; plaintiffs appealed, challenging the FTCA dismissal, Monell dismissal, Fourth Amendment entry ruling, several evidentiary rulings at trial, and a sanctions order against plaintiffs’ counsel for violating a protective order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FTCA exhaustion/jurisdiction | Plaintiffs argue dismissal for failure to exhaust was improper or cured by later exhaustion/amendment | Government argued FTCA exhaustion required and barred suit where defendants acted within scope | Court: FTCA exhaustion is a claim-processing rule, not jurisdictional; district court must reassess timeliness/forfeiture and whether amended complaint cures defect; remanded for district court to decide these issues |
| Municipal liability (Monell) | Plaintiffs argue City failed to train/supervise, causing constitutional violation | Defendants: officers acted under federal authority during a federal task force operation, not state action by the City | Court: Affirmed dismissal—officers acted under color of federal law, Monell claim fails |
| Fourth Amendment (warrantless entry) | Plaintiffs: entry into father’s house was unreasonable/no consent/warrant for that residence | Defendants: arrest warrant for Kellom allowed entry where officers reasonably believed Kellom lived and was present | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for defendants—surveillance, girlfriend’s report, and observed car gave reasonable belief of residence and presence |
| Evidentiary rulings (hearsay / relevance / cumul.) | Plaintiffs: testimony repeating girlfriend’s statements and arrest-warrant facts was hearsay, prejudicial, cumulative; counsel prevented from asking about escape | Defendants: testimony was admissible to show officers’ state of mind, basis for arrest, and to corroborate Quinn; limiting repetitive questioning was proper | Court: Affirmed—statements admissible for non-hearsay purposes (effect on listener, state of mind, corroboration); cumulative argument failed; trial judge within discretion to limit repetitive questioning |
| Sanctions for protective-order violation | Plaintiffs: sanction improper because order unclear and disclosures may not have been of designated materials | Defendants: counsel violated the protective order by publicly disclosing discovery | Court: Vacated $2,000 sanction and remanded for fact-finding on what materials were disclosed and whether those materials were covered by the protective order |
Key Cases Cited
- Copen v. United States, 3 F.4th 875 (6th Cir. 2021) (statutory claim-processing requirements are not necessarily jurisdictional)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (clear statement rule for treating statutory limits as jurisdictional)
- McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (FTCA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (sovereign immunity and limited waiver under federal law)
- Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974) (historical treatment of FTCA exhaustion as jurisdictional)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
- El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2008) (arrest-warrant entry into third-party residence allowed if reasonable belief suspect lives there and is present)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for excessive-force claims)
- Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2009) (out-of-court statements admissible to show effect on listener)
- Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 773 F.3d 161 (6th Cir. 2014) (rule on exclusion of needlessly cumulative evidence)
- Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing state and federal color-of-law contexts)
- Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (distinction between jurisdictional and claim-processing rules)