Neil Rush v. William I. Blackburn, 361 P.3d 217

Background

Rush's 1983 Mercedes was towed from private-easement parking and impounded by Top Notch (William Blackburn) after a third party requested the tow.
Rush timely requested an impound hearing, filed with the district court, and his counsel notified Top Notch; the court mailed hearing notice to Top Notch.
Before the district court heard the matter, Blackburn sold Rush's car at auction to himself for $1 without notifying Rush or his attorney.
The district court later found the impound unlawful and ordered return of the vehicle and damages; Blackburn did not appear at the district impound hearing.
Rush sued in superior court alleging conversion and a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) violation; a default judgment entered against Blackburn, later vacated by the superior court under CR 60.
Blackburn moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA claim; the trial court granted summary judgment for Blackburn on the public‑interest element. The Court of Appeals affirmed vacatur of the default but reversed the CPA dismissal and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Rush)	Defendant's Argument (Blackburn)	Held
Was the superior court's vacatur of the default judgment timely and proper under CR 60(b)(1)?	Vacatur was untimely (default entered July 20, 2012; motion filed Oct. 29, 2013).	Motion was within one year of final judgment because the default was not final until remaining claims against Hartford were dismissed (July 26, 2013).	Vacatur was timely; CR 54(b) meant default became final only after remaining claims were resolved, so CR 60(b)(1) applied and vacatur did not abuse discretion.
Did Blackburn show a prima facie defense, excusable neglect, diligence, and lack of hardship to justify vacating the default?	N/A (this is plaintiff-challenged).	Blackburn argued facts supported vacation (insurance promised to compensate, delay excusable, acted promptly after learning).	Trial court made unchallenged White v. Holm findings; Court of Appeals affirmed that vacatur did not abuse discretion.
Does selling an impounded vehicle before resolution of a timely-requested impound hearing constitute an "unfair or deceptive act or practice" under the CPA?	Blackburn's sale while hearing pending violated WAC 308-61-168 and RCW 46.55 timing, was deceptive to a reasonable consumer, deprived Rush of statutory remedy, and thus satisfies unfair/deceptive element.	Sale was lawful business practice; single incident not likely to repeat; not per se deceptive; no evidence of public impact.	Reversed summary judgment: material fact issues exist whether Blackburn's conduct was unfair or deceptive (violation of regulation, pattern of $1 auctions to self, capacity to mislead consumers).
Did Rush prove the CPA's public‑interest element?	Widespread regulatory framework, evidence Blackburn routinely sold impounded cars to himself/relatives, and the towing relationship coerces consumers — all support capacity to injure others and potential for repetition.	The act was isolated, unlikely to be repeated, and did not show public impact.	Court held fact issues exist on public‑interest prong (capacity to injure others and pattern/likelihood of repetition); summary judgment on CPA public‑interest element was improper.

Key Cases Cited

Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696 (2007) (standards for reviewing vacatur of default judgment and preference for deciding merits)
White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348 (1968) (factors for vacating default: prima facie defense, excusable neglect, diligence, and no hardship)
Hangman Ridge Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778 (1986) (five‑factor framework for public‑interest element of CPA)
Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d 27 (2009) (elements of a private CPA claim and definition of deception)
Klem v. Washington Mutual Bank, 176 Wn.2d 771 (2013) (use of statutory/regulatory violations in assessing unfair/deceptive practices)
Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 181 Wn.2d 775 (2014) (question of whether conduct is unfair/deceptive is legal)
Magnev v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank, 34 Wn. App. 45 (1983) (FT C factors for defining "unfair")
Crane Towing, Inc. v. Gorton, 89 Wn.2d 161 (1977) (recognition of public welfare interests in towing/impound regulation)