Neil Morgan v. Fairfield Cty., Ohio
903 F.3d 553
6th Cir.2018Background
- Morgan and Graf owned a home on ~1 acre; officers noticed no-trespassing signs and limited neighboring sightlines; a second‑story back balcony (only accessible from inside) was present.
- Fairfield County SCRAP officers received anonymous tips of drug activity and conducted a "knock and talk"; five officers surrounded the house (one at each corner ~5–7 feet from the walls) while one officer knocked at the front door.
- While Graf briefly spoke with the officer at the door and closed it, an officer at the rear observed marijuana plants growing on the back balcony; officers then entered, secured the occupants, obtained a search warrant, and found contraband.
- State criminal convictions were vacated on appeal and charges were dropped; Morgan and Graf sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations, naming individual officers, county officials, and Fairfield County.
- The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding (1) qualified immunity for individual officers because the law was not clearly established, and (2) no Monell liability for the county. The Sixth Circuit affirmed qualified immunity but reversed as to municipal liability and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search by entering curtilage during a knock‑and‑talk | Surrounding and entering the area 5–7 feet from the house (and backyard) was entry onto curtilage and thus a search | The perimeter positions were justified as safety measures or were not a search because officers were not there to investigate | Entry onto the perimeter and backyard was a search of curtilage; no warrant or exception justified it, so Fourth Amendment violated |
| Whether any exception (exigency/officer safety/plain view) justified the warrantless intrusion | No exception applied; plain‑view cannot save evidence observed after unconstitutional entry | Officers relied on officer safety/exigency and plain‑view doctrines to justify discovery | County failed to show a particularized exigency or legal arrival point for plain‑view; exceptions do not apply |
| Whether individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity | Morgan and Graf: constitutional right was violated and was clearly established | Officers: circuit precedent (e.g., Turk reading of Hardesty) showed unsettled law at time (June 2012) | Qualified immunity affirmed — although Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the law was not clearly established then due to conflicting Sixth Circuit decisions |
| Whether Fairfield County is liable under Monell for the policy of entering property during knock‑and‑talks | The county maintained a policy directing officers onto the back of properties without regard to constitutional limits, causing the injury | County argued policy could be applied constitutionally in some circumstances and no deliberate indifference shown | Reversed district court: county policy itself required the perimeter/back access and ignored curtilage limits, satisfying Monell causation and liability; case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (physical intrusion onto curtilage to gather evidence is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (curtilage is part of the home and entitled to Fourth Amendment protection)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (factors for determining curtilage)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable; reasonable expectation framework)
- Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (property/trespass test complements Katz; physical intrusion can constitute a search)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (sense‑enhancing technology to obtain interior information is a search)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires municipal policy or custom causing constitutional injury)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide prongs of qualified immunity in flexible order)
- Hardesty v. Hamburg Township, 461 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2006) (permitting limited curtilage intrusion during knock‑and‑talk under certain circumstances; influential in later qualified immunity analysis)
- Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (disagreement among judges can inform qualified immunity; fairness to officers selecting losing side of controversy)