Neil Hornsby v. Alcoa, Inc.
15-35686
| 9th Cir. | Dec 11, 2017Background
- Neil Hornsby worked in Alcoa’s pot rooms intermittently from 2000–2008 and was diagnosed with congestive heart failure (Stage II) in 2015.
- Hornsby sued Alcoa under Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act (claiming Alcoa deliberately injured him), and Alcoa removed the case to federal court.
- Hornsby’s First Amended Complaint alleged Alcoa had "actual knowledge" that exposure at work would certainly cause injury and willfully disregarded that knowledge. Alleged facts: a 2005 heat-collapse, 2007 “mild restrictive” pulmonary results, and a 2008 decline in pulmonary function; employer awareness of studies linking aluminum exposure to pulmonary fibrosis.
- The district court dismissed the First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim; Hornsby appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the complaint met federal notice-pleading and plausibility standards and affirmed dismissal with prejudice, awarding costs to Alcoa.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hornsby pleaded facts showing Alcoa had "actual knowledge" that injury was certain to occur from his work | Hornsby: employer knew studies made it biologically plausible and had employee-specific signs (collapse, declining pulmonary tests) showing certain harm if he returned | Alcoa: cited facts show at most plausibility/possibility, not actual knowledge that Hornsby’s work caused or would certainly cause injury | Court: Dismissed — allegations show only possible/plausible link, not actual knowledge that injury was certain |
| Whether Hornsby pleaded willful disregard by Alcoa | Hornsby: Alcoa ignored studies/testimony and employee indicators | Alcoa: absence of employee or employer contemporaneous awareness that his condition was work-caused; no specific facts of deliberate disregard | Court: Dismissed — without actual knowledge, willful disregard cannot be plausibly alleged |
| Whether Hornsby’s delay in discovering his condition undermines claim that Alcoa had contemporaneous knowledge | Hornsby: employer knowledge comes from studies and records, not from Hornsby’s own awareness | Alcoa: Hornsby himself did not know he was injured until 2014 (years after leaving), making employer actual-knowledge allegation implausible | Court: Dismissed — Hornsby’s late discovery makes employer-knowledge allegation implausible |
| Whether complaint met Rule 8/Iqbal plausibility standard to survive 12(b)(6) | Hornsby: pleaded factual points and cited studies supporting causal link | Alcoa: pleaded facts are conclusory and do not permit a reasonable inference of liability | Court: Dismissed — complaint contains conclusory allegations, not sufficient factual content to state a plausible claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehman v. Nelson, 862 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for notice-pleading compliance)
- Pickern v. Pier 1 Imp. (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2006) (notice-pleading review principles)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for Rule 8 pleading)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim; mere possibility insufficient)
- Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash. 2d 391 (2014) (Washington law: employer immunity under Title 51 with narrow deliberate-injury exception requiring actual knowledge of certain harm)
- Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wash. 2d 853 (1995) (deliberate-injury exception requires actual knowledge injury was certain to occur)
- Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2013) (clarifies plausibility vs. possibility under Iqbal/Twombly)