Neighborhood Centers Inc. v. Doreatha Walker
01-14-00844-CV
| Tex. App. | Sep 21, 2015Background
- This appeal arises from a whistleblower claim (Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 554) by Doreatha Walker against Neighborhood Centers, an open‑enrollment charter school; the trial court denied Neighborhood Centers’ plea to the jurisdiction and the First Court of Appeals affirmed.
- While the appeal was pending, the Texas Legislature amended the Education Code via H.B. 1171 (amending §12.1056) and H.B. 1170 (adding §12.1058), effective June 2015.
- §12.1056 was amended to state charter schools (and their employees/volunteers) are immune from liability and suit “to the same extent as a school district.”
- §12.1058(a)–(b) expressly treats charter schools as local governments for specified statutes (e.g., interlocal cooperation, workers’ comp), but §12.1058(c) provides that an open‑enrollment charter school “is not considered to be a political subdivision, local government, or local governmental entity unless the applicable statute specifically states that the statute applies to an open‑enrollment charter school.”
- Neighborhood Centers moved for rehearing arguing §12.1058(c) eliminated the Whistleblower Act waiver of immunity as to charter schools and thus destroyed subject‑matter jurisdiction; Walker opposed, arguing (1) §§12.1056 and 12.1058 must be read together and still allow Whistleblower Act coverage, (2) the Code Construction Act savings clause preserves accrued rights, and (3) retroactive application would violate federal and state constitutional prohibitions on retroactive laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Walker) | Defendant's Argument (Neighborhood Centers) | Held (Court of Appeals reasoning urged by Walker) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §12.1058(c) abrogates Whistleblower Act waiver of immunity for open‑enrollment charter schools | Read with §12.1056, charter schools remain immune "to the same extent" as school districts, so Whistleblower waiver still applies | §12.1058(c) removes charter schools from being considered local governmental entities for unspecified statutes unless the statute explicitly says so, thereby defeating the Whistleblower waiver | The statutes must be harmonized; §12.1056’s "same extent" language preserves Whistleblower Act applicability to charters; rehearing should be denied |
| Whether the Code Construction Act savings clause preserves Walker’s accrued cause of action | General savings clause (§311.031) prevents amendments from extinguishing accrued rights or pending remedies; Legislature did not express contrary intent | Argues the new provision should apply and deprive Walker of jurisdiction/claim | In absence of contrary legislative intent, the savings clause applies and preserves Walker’s accrued rights |
| Whether applying §12.1058(c) to pending claims would be unconstitutionally retroactive | Retroactive application would destroy vested remedial rights created by the Whistleblower Act and thus violate federal and state anti‑retroactivity clauses | Contends effect is jurisdictional or prospective and should apply to pending appeals | Application here would eliminate Walker’s accrued cause of action and remedy, triggering the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws; therefore it cannot be applied to defeat jurisdiction |
| Proper rule of statutory construction when two related amendments are enacted contemporaneously | Concurrent amendments (§12.1056 and §12.1058) must be read together and harmonized; repeal by implication disfavored | Seeks a narrow reading of §12.1056 and tunnel‑vision reading of §12.1058(c) to defeat coverage | Court should harmonize both provisions, avoid implied repeal, and give effect to §12.1056’s clarifying expansion of immunity/suit parity with school districts |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) (statutory construction looks to the statute as a whole to ascertain legislative intent)
- Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998) (general savings clause prevents repeal from extinguishing accrued rights absent contrary legislative intent)
- Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010) (three‑factor test for retroactivity: public interest, nature of prior right, extent of impairment)
- Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2014) (retrospective application permitted only with extensive legislative findings supporting retroactivity)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (principles for applying new statutes to pending cases; presumption of prospectivity)
- Dallas County Community College Dist. v. Bolton, 185 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2005) (use of Code Construction Act to interpret Education Code provisions)
- City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997) (distinguishing procedural/remedial statute changes from those that impermissibly abolish remedies)