Neighborhood Assn., Inc. v. Limberger, 321 Conn. 29

The Neighborhood Association, Inc. (the association) sought to foreclose on a condominium unit owned by Jill M. Limberger in a common interest community.
General Statutes § 47-258(m)(3) permits an association to commence foreclosure only if (among other things) the executive board either votes to foreclose on a particular unit or has adopted a "standard policy" providing for foreclosure against that unit.
The association's declaration (recorded) expressly notifies unit owners of the association’s lien and foreclosure power, and the declaration tracks § 47-258’s foreclosure language.
The core dispute: whether a standard foreclosure policy must be adopted following the act’s rule-making procedures (notice and comment under § 47-261b) or may be treated as an internal business operating procedure exempt from rule formalities (§ 47-261b(g)).
Chief Justice Rogers (dissenting, joined by Justice Zarella) argues the policy is an internal business operating procedure that need not be adopted as a rule, relying on the statutory definition of "rule," the declaration’s foreclosure language, and the rule-making exceptions in § 47-261b.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a standard foreclosure policy must be adopted as a "rule" under the Common Interest Ownership Act	Association: policy may be an internal business operating procedure and thus is exempt from rule-making requirements	Limberger: a standard foreclosure policy affects owners’ rights and therefore must be adopted as a rule with notice and comment	Majority: a standard foreclosure policy must be adopted as a rule (dissent disagrees)
Whether the declaration and statutory lien provisions negate the need for rule-style notice for foreclosure procedures	Association: recorded declaration and statutory lien provisions give owners sufficient notice; no need for additional rule-making	Limberger: procedural protections and notice/comment required when policies affect owners’ rights	Held: Court (majority) treats standard policy as requiring rule adoption; dissent asserts declaration and statute render rule adoption unnecessary

Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 119 A.3d 570 (2015) (statutory construction principles; examine text and related statutes first)
Lopa v. Brinker International, 296 Conn. 426, 994 A.2d 1265 (2010) (every word of a statute presumed to have meaning; avoid superfluous readings)
Rene Dry Wall Co. v. Strawberry Hill Associates, 182 Conn. 568, 438 A.2d 774 (1980) (remedial statutes construed as authorized by statute; courts cannot extend beyond statutory language)
Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 3 A.3d 56 (2010) (statutory interpretation must consider the broader statutory scheme to ensure coherency)