Negovan v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
172 A.3d 733
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- On June 29, 2016 Officer Fazzio stopped Julie Negovan after observing speeding and swerving; he smelled alcohol and administered field sobriety tests, then arrested her for DUI.
- At St. Mary Medical Center, Fazzio read and gave Negovan Form DL-26 (implied consent warnings) with portions referencing enhanced criminal penalties for refusing blood testing redacted after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota.
- Negovan refused a blood test, declined to sign the form, and later received a 12‑month administrative suspension notice from PennDOT for test refusal; she had separately agreed to a 60‑day ARD suspension as part of the ARD program.
- Negovan appealed the administrative suspension to the Bucks County Common Pleas Court; the trial court upheld the suspension on January 19, 2017, and this appeal followed to the Commonwealth Court.
- Negovan argued the trial court erred because Section 1547(b)(2) requires officers to warn of enhanced DUI criminal penalties and she would have submitted to testing had she been so warned.
- The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding the redaction was consistent with Birchfield and that the enhanced criminal penalties did not apply here; the ARD 60‑day suspension was separate and did not depend on the redacted warning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to read enhanced criminal‑penalty language on Form DL‑26 invalidates civil suspension | Negovan: Section 1547(b)(2) requires notice of enhanced criminal penalties; she would have submitted to the test if warned | DOT: Officer properly redacted unconstitutional criminal‑penalty language after Birchfield; statutory civil suspension notice was given | Held: Affirmed. Redaction was proper under Birchfield; civil suspension stands |
| Whether redaction rendered warnings inaccurate so refusal was involuntary | Negovan: Omitted warning caused misunderstanding of consequences and influenced refusal | DOT: There was no enhanced criminal penalty imposed; warnings provided accurately stated civil suspension consequences | Held: Dismissed—refusal not based on inaccurate warnings |
| Whether ARD 60‑day suspension precludes DOT’s 12‑month suspension for refusal | Negovan: ARD suspension was a penalty under Section 3804(c) that should have been warned about | DOT: ARD suspension arises from Section 3807(d) and is distinct from Section 3804(c) enhanced penalties | Held: ARD suspension is separate; DOT authorized to impose civil suspension for refusal |
| Whether officer constitutionally required to give implied‑consent warnings beyond statutory text | Negovan: (implicit) broader warning required | DOT: Only statutory and O’Connell‑required warnings are necessary; no constitutional right to pre‑warning beyond statute | Held: Only statutory/O’Connell warnings required; no constitutional defect found |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (criminal penalties for refusing blood test invalid; civil implied‑consent penalties remain valid)
- Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989) (required admonition that right to consult an attorney does not apply before submitting to chemical test)
- Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Sinwell, 450 A.2d 235 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (no constitutional right to pre‑warning for implied consent)
- Sheakley v. Dep’t of Transp., 513 A.2d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (duty to warn about breathalyzer consequences is statutory, not constitutional)