Neff v. McGee.
346 Ga. App. 522
Ga. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Sept. 10, 2015, Christal McGee crashed into Wentworth Maynard’s car; Maynards later sued McGee and Snapchat alleging McGee used Snapchat’s Speed Filter and was speeding.
- Neff represented the Maynards and, relying on a passenger affidavit (Heather McCarty), a police report, and an accident reconstruction report, posted an article on his law firm website about the lawsuit and dangers of Snapchat’s Speed Filter.
- Various media outlets picked up the story; McGee later sued Neff for defamation based on the website article and other statements.
- Neff moved to strike/dismiss under Georgia’s anti‑SLAPP statute, OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1, arguing his statements were protected and conditionally privileged under OCGA § 51‑5‑7; the trial court denied the motion.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo, focusing on (1) whether Neff’s communications were privileged as acts in furtherance of petition/free speech on a public issue and (2) whether McGee showed a probability of prevailing by proving falsity and actual malice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Neff’s article/statements were acts in furtherance of petition/free speech on a matter of public concern and thus subject to anti‑SLAPP | McGee argued statements were false and thus not protected; evidence after publication raised doubts about truth and malice | Neff argued his statements related to his clients’ complaint and the public safety concern about Snapchat’s Speed Filter, making them protected under OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1 and OCGA § 51‑5‑7 | Court held Neff’s statements were in connection with an issue of public concern and constituted acts in furtherance of petition/free speech, satisfying the first step of anti‑SLAPP analysis |
| Whether Neff established a prima facie showing of conditional privilege under OCGA § 51‑5‑7 | McGee contended privilege was inapplicable because statements were false and later evidence undercuts Neff’s factual basis | Neff showed he published in good faith, had a legitimate interest, limited scope, proper occasion, and proper audience, relying on McCarty’s affidavit and reconstruction report | Court held Neff made a prima facie showing of conditional privilege as a matter of law |
| Whether McGee demonstrated a probability of prevailing on defamation (i.e., falsity and fault) to survive anti‑SLAPP motion | McGee pointed to conflicting passenger statements and post‑publication affidavits as evidence of falsity and malice | Neff argued he reasonably relied on sworn affidavit, police report, and reconstruction report and lacked serious doubts at publication | Court held McGee failed to show a probability of success; post‑publication evidence cannot show Neff’s state of mind at time of publication |
| Whether McGee showed actual malice to defeat qualified privilege | McGee argued passenger statements and other evidence created a jury question of malice/reckless disregard | Neff argued no clear and convincing evidence he entertained serious doubts; he acted in good faith and for public safety | Court held McGee produced no clear and convincing evidence of actual malice; conclusory allegations insufficient; privilege not defeated |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Dupree, 340 Ga. App. 811 (discussing de novo review of anti‑SLAPP denials)
- Fine v. Communication Trends, Inc., 305 Ga. App. 298 (malice requires clear and convincing proof that defendant entertained serious doubts about truth)
- Smith v. Henry, 276 Ga. App. 831 (qualified privilege and good‑faith inquiry)
- Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Society, 273 Ga. App. 489 (statements made to influence public safety/government may be privileged)
- Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 308 Ga. App. 808 (conclusory allegations of malice and conspiracy insufficient to survive anti‑SLAPP)