NC NAACP State Conference v. Ken Raymond, 981 F.3d 295

In 2016 the Fourth Circuit in McCrory enjoined five provisions of North Carolina’s 2013 omnibus voting law, finding they were enacted with racially discriminatory intent, including a photo‑ID requirement.
In 2018 North Carolina voters approved a constitutional amendment directing the General Assembly to enact a photo‑ID law; during a lame‑duck session the legislature enacted the 2018 Voter‑ID Law, which lists qualifying IDs but also provides free voter‑photo ID cards, provisional ballots with cure, and a "reasonable impediment" affidavit exemption.
NAACP chapters sued the State board and the Governor, alleging the 2018 law was enacted with the same discriminatory intent as the 2013 law and violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and § 2 of the VRA; the district court granted a preliminary injunction finding a likelihood of success on intent grounds.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, focusing on whether the district court properly applied Arlington Heights intent analysis and Abbott v. Perez’s instruction to presume legislative good faith (and not shift the burden based on past misconduct).
The Fourth Circuit held the district court erred by reversing the burden of proof and failing to afford the presumption of legislative good faith; applying the correct burden and presumption, the challengers did not show they were likely to succeed on the merits, so the injunction was reversed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2018 Voter‑ID Law was enacted with racially discriminatory intent	2018 law is continuation of 2013 law’s discriminatory scheme; same actors and data used	Legislature entitled to presumption of good faith; intervening constitutional amendment and different legislative process	Reversed: challengers failed to show likelihood of success; district court abused discretion
Whether the district court correctly allocated the burden and applied presumption of legislative good faith	Past unconstitutional enactment justifies treating new law as tainted and shifting burden	Abbott requires challengers to prove intent; cannot force State to prove a ‘‘purge’’ of past intent	Reversed: district court flipped burden and failed to apply Abbott presumption
Whether the Arlington Heights factors (sequence, legislative history, disparate impact) support an intent finding	Similar personnel, legislative comments, and ID list show discriminatory purpose	Normal legislative process, bipartisan support, intervening voter amendment, and mitigating provisions undermine inference of intent	Reversed: sequence, history, and impact insufficient under proper legal standard
Mootness/standing and injunctive posture	State‑court injunction makes federal appeal moot	Case retains a live federal interest; plaintiffs have representational standing	Not moot; representational standing satisfied; but preliminary injunction cannot stand on merits error

Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (legislature presumed to act in good faith; prior discrimination does not shift burden)
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (prior ruling that 2013 omnibus law was enacted with discriminatory intent)
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality upholding a voter‑ID law on burden/benefit balancing)
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (framework for proving discriminatory intent)
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (discriminatory intent as a substantial or motivating factor)
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (two‑step intent inquiry and burden allocation)
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding a voter‑ID law that included mitigating features)
Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018) (reversing a district court that presumed new law tainted by predecessor)
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (discussion of burden allocation in remedial contexts)