970 F.3d 489
4th Cir.2020Background
- North Carolina enacted S.B. 824 (2018) imposing photographic voter-ID requirements; Governor Cooper vetoed it but legislature overrode the veto and the law took effect.
- The NAACP sued Governor Cooper and members of the State Board of Elections challenging S.B. 824 under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
- Senate President Pro Tempore Philip Berger and House Speaker Tim Moore ("Proposed Intervenors") moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, relying on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-72.2 which declares the Speaker and President Pro Tempore agents of the State with standing to intervene in challenges to state statutes.
- The district court denied the initial motion without prejudice (allowing amicus participation), and later denied a renewed motion with prejudice, finding the State defendants (represented by the Attorney General) were adequately defending S.B. 824.
- The Fourth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction over the November 7 denial, concluded the Proposed Intervenors have Article III standing, rejected North Carolina separation-of-powers objections to § 1-72.2, and VACATED and REMANDED for the district court to reconsider Rule 24 issues (interest, impairment, adequacy, and permissive intervention) applying the correct legal standards.
- Judge Harris dissented, arguing the Attorney General’s active defense supports a strong presumption of adequacy (rejecting intervention) and that the district court’s denial should be affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction over renewed-denial appeal | Berger/Moore: November 7 denial is conclusive and appealable | NAACP: failure to appeal the initial denial forfeits review | Court: November 7 order was a final, appealable denial; jurisdiction exists |
| Article III standing to intervene | Berger/Moore: § 1-72.2 designates them as State agents with standing | NAACP: state statute cannot confer Article III standing; no concrete injury | Court: Proposed Intervenors have Article III standing for intervention purposes (state designation and Supreme Court precedent inform analysis) |
| NC separation-of-powers challenge to § 1-72.2 | NAACP/State Defs: statute usurps executive power to enforce/defend laws | Berger/Moore: defending a law is different from executing it; statute merely permits defense participation | Court: § 1-72.2 does not violate NC separation of powers; legislative defense is not executive enforcement |
| Rule 24(a) — "interest" element | Berger/Moore: statute and legislative role confer a significantly protectable interest in defending S.B. 824 | District court/State Defs: no special interest because State defendants already defend the law | Court: remand — district court erred by not fully considering § 1-72.2 and related precedents when assessing the interest element |
| Rule 24(a) — "adequacy" and presumption standard | Berger/Moore: Westinghouse minimal burden applies; state statute weighs in adequacy | State Defs/Dist. Ct.: presumption of adequacy requires a strong showing (per Stuart); AG adequately defends law | Court: remand — apply Westinghouse presumption but do not require Stuart’s heightened "strong showing"; Proposed Intervenors must rebut presumption by minimal showing of adversity, collusion, or nonfeasance |
| Rule 24(b) — permissive intervention | Berger/Moore: permissive intervention appropriate given state policy and interests | District court: addition would delay and prejudice parties; burdensome for court | Court: remand — district court failed to consider § 1-72.2; reconsider permissive intervention in light of statute and trial-management concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987) (distinguishes immediately appealable denials from interlocutory orders permitting intervention)
- Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (state may designate agents to speak for it in federal court)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (state has standing to defend its statutes and may designate agents)
- Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (successors in office have authority to pursue legislature’s interests)
- Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (minimal burden to show inadequate representation for intervention)
- Virginia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 542 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1976) (presumption of adequate representation when objectives align; rebuttable by adversity, collusion, or nonfeasance)
- Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013) (applied a ‘‘strong showing’’ requirement when private parties seek to intervene against a government defendant)
- Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2019) (denied legislative intervention where attorney general actively defended statute; advocated a high bar to rebut presumption)
- Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (state-law authorization can give legislators standing to represent state interests)
- Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (recognizes certain legislative standing where state law authorizes it)