929 F.3d 1270
10th Cir.2019Background
- San Juan County, Utah (~52% Native American) adopted single-member county-commission districts in 1984 after a 1983 DOJ suit and consent decree replacing prior at-large elections; District 3 was designed to be majority Navajo.
- After the 2010 census the county left County Commission District 3 largely intact (over 92% Native American) and made only minor school-district adjustments; the Navajo Nation sued alleging racial gerrymandering (Equal Protection) for District 3 and one-person, one-vote violations for the county school-board districts (≈38% population deviation).
- The district court denied the county’s motion to dismiss, granted summary judgment to the Navajo Nation on both Equal Protection claims, rejected the county’s proposed remedial plan as race-predominant, appointed a special master (Bernard Grofman), and ordered the county to adopt the special master’s remedial plan and hold special elections.
- The county appealed, raising jurisdictional arguments about the 1984 consent decree, challenging the District 3 racial-classification ruling, contesting justification for the school-board population deviations, and disputing both the rejection of its remedial plan and the district court’s adoption of the special master’s plan.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed in all respects: (1) the Navajo Nation’s suit was not a collateral attack on the consent decree and the United States was not indispensable; (2) District 3’s race-based lines failed strict scrutiny; (3) the school-board deviations were unjustified; (4) the county’s remedial plan was race-predominant and not narrowly tailored; and (5) the special master’s plan was lawful and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction / collateral attack on 1984 consent decree | Navajo Nation: new challenge to district lines is permissible; Navajo Nation was not party to 1984 decree | San Juan: claim is collateral attack because the earlier decree retained jurisdiction and involved the same subject; United States is indispensable | Court: Navajo Nation was not party to 1984 suit; this action does not implicate the decree’s subject matter; denial of dismissal affirmed |
| County-commission District 3 racial classification (Equal Protection) | Navajo Nation: District 3 was drawn based on race and fails strict scrutiny | County: lines were required by consent decree or necessary to comply with §2 of VRA | Court: county conceded race predominated; consent decree did not mandate locked lines; county lacked narrow tailoring and strong basis in evidence for §2 compliance; summary judgment for Navajo Nation affirmed |
| School-board districts: one-person, one-vote (≈38% deviation) | Navajo Nation: large longstanding deviation dilutes votes; needs justification | County: deviation justified by school-community philosophy, geography, sparse population, and precinct integrity | Court: deviations >10% create prima facie case; county’s justifications insufficient even under Anderson-Burdick; summary judgment for Navajo Nation affirmed |
| County’s proposed remedial plan (race predominance and strict scrutiny) | Navajo Nation: county’s remedial plan prioritized racial proportionality and subordinated traditional criteria | County: plan aimed to comply with VRA and traditional principles | Court: factual finding that race predominated in several districts not clearly erroneous; county failed narrow-tailoring / strong-basis-in-evidence for §2; remedial plan rejected |
| Court-appointed special master’s remedial plan (adoption by court) | Navajo Nation: Grofman’s race-neutral plan complies with one-person-one-vote and avoids race predominance | County: Grofman’s plan unlawfully uses race, splits communities, ignores precincts/administration | Court: Grofman used race-neutral principles, minimized deviations, made limited final §2-aware adjustments; race did not predominate; district court did not abuse discretion in ordering adoption |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (Sup. Ct.) (race predominance and strict scrutiny in redistricting)
- Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (Sup. Ct.) (race as predominant factor requires strict scrutiny)
- Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (Sup. Ct.) (plaintiff must show race predominated and that traditional criteria were subordinated)
- Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (Sup. Ct.) (race-based districting impermissible without sufficient justification)
- Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (Sup. Ct.) (need a strong basis in evidence to use race to comply with §2)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (Sup. Ct.) (one-person, one-vote principle)
- Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (Sup. Ct.) (one-person, one-vote applies to local government)
- Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (Sup. Ct.) (deviations under 10% are minor; over 10% creates prima facie case)
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (Sup. Ct.) (VRA §2 and conditions for vote-dilution claims)
- Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (Sup. Ct.) (rejected strict proportionality as §2 safe harbor)