Nauheim v. City of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145

Background

In 2011 Topeka authorized a public works project to replace a drainage system; ordinance did not mention condemnation.
In 2013 the City negotiated purchase of privately owned property used by commercial tenants; the City required the property be vacant at closing and did not institute eminent domain proceedings.
Tenants Charles Nauheim and Hal Richardson relocated and sued the City under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518 seeking relocation benefits, claiming the acquisition was "through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action."
The district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding tenants were not "displaced persons" and that the acquisition was not "in advance of a condemnation action."
The Court of Appeals reversed on both displaced-person status and whether genuine factual disputes existed about the City’s intent to condemn, and remanded. The Supreme Court granted review on the statutory-interpretation question.
The Supreme Court held that (1) K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518 covers two distinct situations—acquisition by negotiation in advance of condemnation, or by condemnation—and (2) whether a negotiation was "in advance of a condemnation action" is a question of fact (temporal and contextual) to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; specific proof of a threat or affirmative step to condemn is not the only admissible evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether tenants are "displaced persons" under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518	Tenants: relocation was inseparably linked to City's acquisition; qualifies them as displaced persons	City: tenants moved due to landlord agreements, not City action; statute doesn't apply	Court of Appeals (not contested on review): tenants qualify as displaced persons; Supreme Court did not disturb that result
Meaning of "negotiation in advance of a condemnation action" — must claimant prove City intended to condemn?	Tenants: any negotiation by a condemning authority is "in advance" and triggers benefits; no need to prove intent to condemn	City: statute should require showing the authority was prepared to condemn; otherwise benefits would apply to every acquisition	Supreme Court: phrase is temporal and contextual; claimant must prove (by preponderance) negotiation occurred before condemnation proceedings and that condemnation would have followed had negotiation failed; intent/threat/affirmative steps are relevant but not exclusively required
Proper evidentiary standard for proving "in advance"	Tenants: should not have to litigate City's intent; lower burden	City: require specific evidence of intent to condemn to avoid automatically imposing relocation costs on every purchase	Supreme Court: question of fact; proof by preponderance of evidence; all relevant evidence admissible; summary judgment improper given disputed facts
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on record presented	Tenants: record contained evidence (emails, affidavit, ordinance, engineering study) creating genuine disputes	City: insisted no intent to condemn and project could proceed without acquisition	Supreme Court: affirmed Court of Appeals that genuine disputed facts exist and remanded for fact-finder to resolve whether condemnation would have followed failed negotiations

Key Cases Cited

Central Kansas Medical Center v. Hatesohl, 308 Kan. 992 (statutory interpretation de novo review)
Whaley v. Sharp, 301 Kan. 192 (give common words ordinary meaning; plain language controls)
Creegan v. State, 305 Kan. 1156 (process under Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act)
General Building Contr., L.L.C. v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 275 Kan. 525 (statutory requirements before condemnation proceedings)
In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686 (definition and application of preponderance of the evidence standard)