381 P.3d 508
Kan. Ct. App.2016Background
- Tenants Charles Nauheim and Hal Richardson leased commercial property from the James D. Henderson Living Trust. The City of Topeka negotiated to buy the landlord’s property for a drainage project and required the property be vacant at closing.
- City staff emailed the landlord indicating concern about tenant lease interests and stating condemnation was an option if negotiations failed.
- The landlord cancelled the tenants’ leases so the properties would be vacant; the City purchased the properties without exercising eminent domain.
- Tenants sued the City under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-518 seeking relocation benefits, arguing their displacements were a “direct result” of the City’s acquisition and that the acquisition was “in advance of a condemnation action.”
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City, finding (1) tenants were not "displaced persons" and (2) the acquisition was not "in advance of a condemnation action." The tenants appealed.
- The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment, holding tenants were displaced persons and material fact questions remained whether the City negotiated in advance of condemnation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether tenants are "displaced persons" under the federal URA definition incorporated by K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-518 | Tenants: their forced moves were the direct result of the City conditioning purchase on vacancy, so they meet the URA definition | City: tenants moved because the landlord terminated leases, so displacement was indirect and caused by landlord, not City acquisition | Court: tenants are "displaced persons" — the City’s conditional insistence on vacancy made the relocations a direct result of the acquisition |
| Whether statute applies only when acquisition is "through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action" (i.e., requires intent/threat to condemn) | Tenants: statute’s plain language does not add an intent-to-condemn requirement; any negotiation by a condemning authority qualifies | City: permitting all municipal purchases to qualify would render the "in advance of a condemnation action" phrase surplusage; statute requires a threat or affirmative steps toward condemnation | Court: statute requires evidence that the condemning authority threatened or took steps toward condemnation; "in advance of a condemnation action" is meaningful |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the condemnation-advance question | Tenants: emails and landlord affidavit create factual dispute whether City intended condemnation if negotiations failed | City: emails show City preferred not to condemn and did not threaten condemnation; there was a willing seller, so no threat | Court: genuine factual dispute exists (emails + landlord affidavit); summary judgment improper; remand for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891 (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for nonmovant)
- Stroda v. Joice Holdings, 288 Kan. 718 (when material facts undisputed, appellate review is de novo)
- Dawson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 428 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (tenant displacement not "direct result" where landlord’s independent sale was proximate cause)
- Siruta v. Siruta, 301 Kan. 757 (presumption against rendering statutory language surplusage)
- O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 Kan. 318 (statutory interpretation is a question of law)
- Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547 (plain/unambiguous statutory language controls)
- Mastin v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 10 Kan. App. 2d 620 (summary judgment should not substitute for credibility determinations)