National Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mutual Insurance Company, 82 F. Supp. 3d 55

An August 2011 earthquake damaged hundreds of exterior limestone panels on National Presbyterian Church’s façade; the church filed an insurance claim with GuideOne.
Both parties agree the damaged panels themselves are covered and that repairing only those panels would not exceed the deductible.
The church seeks payment not only for structural repair but also for measures to make repairs visually match the existing façade (e.g., cleaning or other means) to avoid mismatched new panels.
GuideOne contends the policy does not require funding for aesthetic matching beyond repairing or replacing only the damaged panels.
The dispute centers on interpreting the policy’s loss-payment and valuation provisions (terms like “lost or damaged property,” “property,” and “other property of like kind and quality”).
The court found the policy language ambiguous as to whether matching is required and, under D.C. law, construed the ambiguity in favor of the insured, holding that matching is required.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the policy requires the insurer to pay for repairs that ensure an aesthetically matching façade (matching)	Policy requires restoration that makes the insured whole, including aesthetic matching (e.g., cleaning or other non‑replacement measures); "like kind and quality" implies matching	Policy covers repair/replacement of the damaged units only; insurer may limit payment to cost of replacing only the damaged panels	Court held policy ambiguous and resolved ambiguity for insured: matching required
How to read terms "property" vs. "lost or damaged property" and "like kind and quality"—whether they denote unit-by-unit or broader coverage	Ambiguity supports a reading that "property" and "like kind and quality" can encompass broader units (e.g., an entire façade or contiguous area) to avoid an unrepaired mismatch	Insurer argues distinctions permit narrower coverage (only damaged pieces) and that broader reading would be unduly burdensome	Court concluded the phrasing could reasonably be read both ways; ambiguity exists and favors insured, supporting matching coverage

Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483 (D.C. Cir.) (courts may grant judgment on the pleadings when no material facts are disputed)
John Akridge Co. v. Travelers Cos., 876 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.) (construction of insurance contract terms is a question of law)
Cameron v. USAA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 733 A.2d 965 (D.C.) (contract terms construed in their ordinary meaning absent technical usage)
Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 32 (D.C.) (unambiguous contract language controls and extrinsic evidence is unnecessary)
Holt v. George Washington Life Ins. Co., 123 A.2d 619 (D.C.) (ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in favor of the insured)
Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202 (D.C.) (courts will not create ambiguity where ordinary meaning is clear)