National Pork Producers Council v. Ross
598 U.S. 356
| SCOTUS | 2023Background
- In 2018 California voters approved Proposition 12, banning the in‑state sale of whole pork from breeding pigs (or their offspring) confined so they cannot lie down, stand up, fully extend limbs, or turn around; compliance mechanisms and third‑party certification were contemplated.
- Petitioners (National Pork Producers Council and American Farm Bureau Federation) sued on behalf of members who raise/process pigs, alleging Prop 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing burdens primarily on out‑of‑state producers because California imports most of its pork.
- Petitioners disavowed a discrimination claim (they conceded Prop 12 imposes the same rule on in‑state and out‑of‑state producers) and instead advanced: (a) an "extraterritoriality" theory (an almost‑per‑se rule invalidating laws that practically control out‑of‑state commerce) and (b) a Pike balancing claim (state law invalid if burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive relative to putative local benefits).
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim; the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review legal sufficiency.
- The Court (majority opinion by Gorsuch, parts joined by various justices) affirmed the Ninth Circuit: rejected an expansive extraterritoriality rule and declined to extend Pike to invalidate nondiscriminatory regulation of in‑state sales on the pleadings here; several opinions addressed whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded a substantial burden and whether courts are institutionally suited to weigh incommensurable benefits against economic burdens.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dormant Commerce Clause forbids state laws with substantial "extraterritorial effects" even if nondiscriminatory (an almost‑per‑se rule) | Prop 12 has practical extraterritorial effect and should be invalidated under an almost‑per‑se extraterritoriality doctrine (Healy/Baldwin/Brown‑Forman support) | Those cases addressed purposeful economic protectionism; no authority for an across‑the‑board extraterritoriality rule that would sweep up nondiscriminatory in‑state regulations | Rejected petitioners' proposed almost‑per‑se extraterritoriality rule; Healy/Baldwin/Brown‑Forman concerned discriminatory protectionism, not a free‑standing extraterritorial ban |
| Whether Pike balancing permits courts to invalidate nondiscriminatory state regulation of in‑state sales by weighing burdens on interstate commerce against local benefits | Pike requires courts to assess burdens and enjoin laws whose burdens are clearly excessive relative to benefits; Prop 12's burdens outweigh its benefits | Pike and precedent focus on rooting out discrimination or protecting national uniformity for transportation instrumentalities; courts should be cautious about substituting policy judgments for democratic choices | Court declined to adopt petitioners' broad invitation to use Pike to strike nondiscriminatory in‑state sale regulations as a matter of course; majority emphasized caution and limits on judicial role |
| Whether plaintiffs plausibly pleaded a "substantial burden" on interstate commerce (threshold for Pike review) | Complaint alleges pervasive compliance costs, industry restructuring, and market‑wide effects that primarily fall on out‑of‑state producers | Many producers already use group housing; market actors can adjust (comply, segregate, or exit); allegations at motion‑to‑dismiss stage are speculative and resemble protection of particular business models (not protected) | A plurality found plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege a substantial burden (invoking Exxon); concurring/dissenting opinions disagreed—some would find the pleading adequate and remand for Pike balancing |
| Scope of permissible interests courts may weigh under dormant Commerce Clause (economic vs noneconomic harms/benefits) | Petitioners highlighted economic harms; also pointed to noneconomic downstream effects on husbandry and animal welfare (as harms) | Defendants argued states may legislate to vindicate moral/health preferences for in‑state sales; courts lack a workable baseline to compare incommensurable moral/health benefits against economic costs | Court refused to treat noneconomic or generalized out‑of‑state welfare interests as standalone dormant Commerce Clause harms; several Justices stressed limits on judicial reweighing of democratic moral/health judgments |
Key Cases Cited
- Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (invalidated state law that fixed minimum in‑state prices for milk to protect local industry; classic protectionism/price‑control case)
- Brown‑Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (struck down price‑affirmation rule that sought to eliminate out‑of‑state pricing advantages; protectionist purpose emphasized)
- Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (invalidated Connecticut price‑affirmation law because its practical effect controlled out‑of‑state prices and hoarded commerce for in‑state interests)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (articulated balancing test: nondiscriminatory regulations are valid unless burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive relative to local benefits)
- Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (held Commerce Clause does not protect particular commercial structures or methods of operation; market‑share shifts among interstate firms did not alone establish prohibited burden)
- Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995) (recognized dormant Commerce Clause as a negative command limiting certain state economic regulations)
- Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (reiterated that the dormant Commerce Clause principally targets economic protectionism; Pike line and antidiscrimination principles interrelate)
- United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida‑Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (cautioned against using dormant Commerce Clause as a license for federal courts to substitute their policy judgments for local democratic decisions)
- Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (treated compliance costs together with consequential harms—like safety and delays—as relevant to whether a regulation burdens interstate commerce)
- Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (plurality) (considered how safety and accident‑risk consequences factor into the Commerce Clause burden analysis)