National Oilseed Processors Ass'n v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration
769 F.3d 1173
D.C. Cir.2014Background
- OSHA revised its Hazard Communication Standard in 2012 to conform in part with the Globally Harmonized System, requiring employers to classify and communicate chemical hazards, including labeling, safety data sheets, and training (29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200).
- Petitioners are trade groups representing businesses that handle grain and agricultural products; they sought vacatur of the Final Rule as applied to combustible dust.
- OSHA’s Final Rule explicitly designated “combustible dust” as a hazardous chemical subject to the Hazard Communication Standard but did not adopt a single new definition, instead pointing to prior OSHA guidance (2008 National Emphasis Program, 2009 Guidance) and later issuing a 2013 Guidance on classification methods.
- OSHA has a separate, ongoing rulemaking specifically addressing combustible dust hazards (substantive control measures), but treated combustible dust under the Hazard Communication Standard (an information-transmittal rule) as an interim measure.
- Petitioners raised procedural (inadequate notice), statutory (failure to define combustible dust and improper reliance on guidance), and constitutional (facial vagueness / due process; brief First Amendment claim) challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Notice / logical outgrowth | NPRM did not give adequate notice that grain dust would be regulated as "combustible dust" under the revised Standard; grain industry could not reasonably anticipate this because grain was already regulated under the Grain Handling Standard. | NPRM expressly proposed treating combustible dust as an "unclassified hazard," solicited comment on that approach, and OSHA’s prior interpretations and enforcement guidance put the grain industry on notice. | Court: Final Rule was a logical outgrowth of the NPRM; notice was adequate. |
| Definition / statutory review (substantial evidence) | OSHA unreasonably refused to adopt a uniform definition in the Final Rule and should have resolved definitional issues in the separate combustible-dust rulemaking. | OSHA reasonably relied on preexisting OSHA guidance and industry consensus standards as interim operative definitions and explained urgency and distinct purposes of the two rulemakings. | Court: OSHA provided adequate explanation and substantial evidence to use interim operative definitions and guidance. |
| Facial vagueness / Due Process | Lack of a clear definition renders the Final Rule unconstitutionally vague, causing compliance uncertainty and risk of discriminatory enforcement. | Challenge is unripe; but even on the merits, OSHA’s Final Rule plus guidance give regulated parties sufficient notice and classification methods. | Court: Claim ripe; on the merits, term is not facially void for vagueness — guidance and prior materials afford ascertainable standards. |
| First Amendment (compelled speech) | (Footnoted) Compelled communication of combustible-dust hazards triggers strict scrutiny. | Argument inadequately developed and raised only in a footnote. | Court: Declined to consider the First Amendment claim because it was perfunctorily raised. |
Key Cases Cited
- United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (framework for substantial-evidence review of complex agency safety regulations and required agency explanation).
- Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. OSHA, 485 F.3d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (agency reliance on manufacturers to classify hazardous chemicals under Hazard Communication Standard).
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness balancing: fitness and hardship factors for pre-enforcement review).
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (facial vagueness doctrine and ripeness in regulatory challenges).
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ascertainable-certainty test for notice from agency regulations and statements).