763 F.3d 627
6th Cir.2014Background
- Congress enacted the Mine Act (1977) giving MSHA authority to set mandatory health/safety standards, inspect mines, and issue citations; it created a specific administrative review scheme for "mandatory health or safety standards."
- MSHA issued a new "pattern of violations" rule in 2013 (codified at 30 C.F.R. Part 104) after proposing it in 2011; the rule creates criteria and procedures for identifying operators who have a pattern of violations and authorizes withdrawal orders following certain inspections.
- Two consolidated petitions for review were filed directly in the Sixth Circuit in March 2013 by trade associations (NMA petitioners) and coal companies (Murray Energy petitioners) challenging the final rule.
- The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over "mandatory health or safety standards" under 30 U.S.C. § 811(d), and the pattern-of-violations rule is not such a standard. Petitioners urged that either (1) courts of appeals can review all substantive Mine Act rulemaking or (2) the rule qualifies as a mandatory standard.
- The Sixth Circuit concluded the pattern-of-violations rule is not a "mandatory health or safety standard," held that it lacks jurisdiction for initial review under the Mine Act, and dismissed the petitions without prejudice. The court also declined to transfer the cases to a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sixth Circuit has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a direct challenge to MSHA’s 2013 pattern-of-violations rule | Courts of appeals may review all substantive rulemaking under the Mine Act, or the rule is itself a "mandatory health or safety standard" subject to § 811(d) review | Courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over "mandatory health or safety standards"; the pattern rule is not such a standard, so initial review is in district court (or via administrative proceedings) | The rule is not a mandatory health or safety standard; the Sixth Circuit lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the petitions without prejudice |
| Whether the pattern-of-violations rule qualifies as a "mandatory health or safety standard" under 30 U.S.C. § 802(l) | The rule was promulgated pursuant to subchapter I and thus counts as a standard promulgated under subchapter I | The statutory definition and context show "standards" means mandatory health or safety standards (e.g., those under § 811(a) or subchapters II/III); the pattern rule regulates MSHA procedures and enforcement, not substantive operator obligations | The court held the rule is not a mandatory health or safety standard: it regulates the Secretary’s enforcement procedures rather than imposes substantive operator obligations |
| Whether Bituminous Coal and related decisions require courts of appeals to be the initial forum for all Mine Act regulation challenges | Petitioners relied on Bituminous Coal’s broad language to argue appellate review is required | The court noted Bituminous Coal and some D.C. Circuit dicta are distinguishable and that modern APA/OSH Act analogues support district-court initial review absent an explicit congressionally granted appellate-review route | The court rejected the broad reading of Bituminous Coal and treated the Mine Act like the OSH Act: absent explicit appellate-review provision, initial review belongs in district court |
| Whether transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to a district court is appropriate instead of dismissal | Petitioners asked for transfer if the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction | Secretary argued proper forum depends on challenge type; petitioners did not identify a specific district or show transfer is in interest of justice | Court declined to transfer because petitioners failed to justify transfer location or show it was in the interest of justice; dismissed without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (Mine Act administrative scheme can preclude district-court jurisdiction for pre-enforcement challenges)
- Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Congress may specify the court for judicial review; default is district court absent special-review statute)
- Workplace Health & Safety Council v. Reich, 56 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (distinguishing ‘‘standards’’ and ‘‘regulations’’ under OSH Act; standards get direct appellate review, regulations are reviewed in district court)
- Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Chao, 300 F.3d 867 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing Mine Act’s modeling on the OSH Act and review parallels)
- La. Chem. Ass’n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1981) (Congress created different review routes for standards vs. regulations; initial review of regulations in district court)
- Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (appellate review accepted where deferred regulation was effectively an amendment to a mandatory safety standard)