National Federation of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1101
9th Cir.2016Background
- National Federation of the Blind and three blind individuals sued United Airlines under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act, alleging United’s touchscreen-only airport kiosks exclude blind travelers.
- United’s kiosks perform check-in, boarding pass printing, baggage check, seat selection, upgrades, etc., but lack audio/tactile interfaces; United did not implement available accessibility technologies.
- District court dismissed the suit, holding state-law claims preempted (expressly under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) and impliedly under the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA)).
- After briefing, DOT replaced an interim kiosk rule with a detailed final regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 382.57 (2013), prescribing technical accessibility requirements (speech output, tactile controls, Braille, timing, volume, phase-in deadlines).
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the Federation’s claims are not expressly preempted by the ADA but are impliedly field preempted by the ACAA and DOT’s comprehensive kiosk regulation; the dismissal was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state disability claims are expressly preempted by ADA § 41713(b)(1) as laws "related to ... price, route, or service" | State antidiscrimination laws regulate accessibility, not airline "services" as that term means point-to-point transportation, so not preempted | Kiosks are part of airline services; state rules regulating kiosks relate to carrier services and are therefore expressly preempted | Court: Not expressly preempted — under Ninth Circuit precedent (Charas) "service" focuses on point-to-point transportation and not amenities like kiosks |
| Whether FAA saving clause forbids implied field preemption under the ACAA | FAA saving clause preserves state remedies and therefore bars implied preemption for claims not expressly preempted | Saving clause does not categorically bar ordinary implied preemption; Geier and related precedent permit implied preemption where federal scheme occupies the field | Court: FAA saving clause does not preclude ordinary implied preemption principles; field preemption can apply |
| Whether DOT’s kiosk regulations (14 C.F.R. § 382.57) occupy the field of airport kiosk accessibility such that state-law claims are impliedly preempted | Federation: DOT regulations do not preempt state law; interim rule was limited and final rule could be challenged — state claims should survive | United/DOT: The final rule is comprehensive and detailed; DOT intended to occupy the field of kiosk accessibility | Court: The final regulation is pervasive and detailed, covering substantive standards and timing; it occupies the field and preempts state-law claims |
| Whether DOT had authority to promulgate § 382.57 (i.e., regulation valid and within delegated authority) | Federation: ACAA limits regulation to "air transportation" and DOT exceeded authority; regulation could be invalid under APA | United/DOT: ACAA and FAA delegation authorize DOT to regulate airlines’ interactions and accessibility; DOT acted within authority | Court: DOT acted within its delegated authority; regulation valid for preemption analysis (APA challenge may be litigated elsewhere but does not prevent preemption ruling) |
Key Cases Cited
- Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) ("service" in ADA preemption interpreted to mean point-to-point transportation, not amenities)
- Gilstrap v. United Air Lines, Inc., 709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (ACAA regulatory background and field-preemption analysis in airline accessibility context)
- Newman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (discrimination claims by disabled passengers do not automatically trigger ADA express preemption)
- Wolens v. American Airlines, Inc., 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (limits on state regulation of economic aspects of airlines; frequent-flyer context informing preemption scope)
- Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) (preemption under a related statute—focus on regulation of carriage itself)
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (saving clauses do not categorically block implied preemption where federal regulatory scheme occupies field)
- Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013) (caution against overbroad definitions of "transportation service"; analyze connection to transportation activities)
- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (panel cannot overrule en banc precedent — bounds on panel authority)