National City Bank v. Owen Bedasee
708 F. App'x 641
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Owen and Sandie Bedasee, pro se defendants in a Florida foreclosure, removed the state foreclosure action to federal court asserting removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) and alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- They claimed the state court prevented them from submitting documents and failed to determine its subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The federal district court sua sponte remanded the case to state court, noting this was the Bedasees’ second removal attempt and that a final judgment had been entered in state court; it concluded it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.
- The Bedasees appealed the remand; the Bank moved to dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
- The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal insofar as it challenged remand based on Rooker–Feldman but allowed the appeal to proceed on whether removal under § 1443 was proper.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed jurisdiction de novo and affirmed that § 1443 removal was improper because the Bedasees’ asserted federal grounds did not meet the Rachel two-prong test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) was proper | Bedasees argued they were denied federal constitutional rights (Due Process, Takings, § 1983) in state court and so could remove under § 1443 | Bank argued removal under § 1443 was improper because the claimed rights are not rights "of racial equality" and were not shown to be denied/enforceable only in state court | Removal under § 1443(1) improper; Bedasees failed both Rachel prongs |
| Whether Due Process, Takings Clause, or § 1983 can support § 1443 removal | Bedasees relied on these federal provisions as the basis for removal | Bank contended those provisions are general federal rights, not phrased in terms of racial equality required by Rachel | Court held those provisions do not satisfy Rachel’s first prong and cannot support § 1443 removal |
| Whether Bedasees showed they were denied enforcement of the asserted rights in state court | Bedasees claimed state court denied them ability to present documents and jurisdictional determination | Bank disputed that any denial of enforcement meeting Rachel’s second prong occurred | Court held Bedasees did not demonstrate they were denied or unable to enforce those rights in state court |
| Appellate reviewability of remand order | Bedasees appealed the remand | Bank argued § 1447(d) bars review of remands | Court dismissed the appeal portion challenging remand based on Rooker–Feldman but allowed appellate review as to § 1443 issue; ultimately affirmed denial of § 1443 removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (establishes two-prong test for § 1443(1) removal requiring rights phrased in terms of racial equality and denial of enforcement in state court)
- Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (federal district courts lack authority to review state-court judgments)
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (clarifies Rooker–Feldman bar on federal review of state-court adjudications)
- Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773 (11th Cir. 2005) (federal appellate standard: de novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction after removal)
- Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (holds § 1983 and Due Process Clause are not rights phrased in terms of racial equality for § 1443 purposes)