Natia Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012

Natia Sampson, H.S.’s court‑appointed legal guardian, alleges a DCFS social worker (Ahmed Obakhume) made sexual comments, touched her inappropriately, and pressured her while she sought guardianship and county benefits.
Sampson complained internally; supervisors allegedly dismissed her complaints and the harassment continued. She also experienced delays/denials in F‑Rate (specialized care) benefits and being forced to supervise parent visits.
After Sampson complained, DCFS officials allegedly filed false abuse/neglect allegations and sought to remove H.S. from Sampson’s custody; a county warrant briefly issued (unexecuted) and the Court of Appeal temporarily authorized removal before later vacating the stay and returning H.S.
Sampson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation (for complaining), Fourteenth Amendment equal‑protection sexual harassment, due‑process claims, and Monell liability; the district court dismissed on qualified immunity and Rule 12(b)(6) grounds.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit: vacated qualified immunity as to the First Amendment retaliation claim (relying on Capp), remanded that claim for consideration of plausibility, but affirmed qualified immunity for the Fourteenth Amendment sexual‑harassment claim while announcing that going forward sexual harassment by public officials providing social services violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
First Amendment retaliation — did officials retaliate by threatening/removing custody to chill complaints?	Sampson: she engaged in protected speech (complaints about harassment/administration); officials retaliated via false allegations and removal efforts.	Defendants: no clearly established First Amendment liability for social workers outside established contexts; entitled to qualified immunity.	Court: Right was clearly established (Capp); vacated qualified immunity for retaliation claim and remanded to assess claim plausibility.
Fourteenth Amendment equal‑protection — does sexual harassment by a social worker violate equal protection?	Sampson: Obakhume’s sex‑based harassment (comments, touching, coercion) is invidious sex discrimination under Equal Protection.	Defendants: no clearly established constitutional right protecting private recipients of social services from sexual harassment by officials; qualified immunity applies.	Court: Holds such harassment is constitutionally prohibited going forward, but at the time conduct occurred the right was not "clearly established;" affirmed qualified immunity.

Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2019) (First Amendment: social worker’s threat to remove custody as retaliation was unconstitutional and clearly established)
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (retaliatory motive must be but‑for cause in certain First Amendment retaliation claims)
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (government may not deny benefits based on protected speech)
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (standards for First Amendment retaliation and chilling effect)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Equal Protection Clause principle that similarly situated persons should be treated alike)
Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment can constitute impermissible sex discrimination under Equal Protection)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (an official can be on notice that conduct is unlawful even in novel factual circumstances)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework: (1) constitutional violation, (2) clearly established right)