Nathan Sinko v. State of Mississippi
192 So. 3d 1069
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In May 2012 Nathan Sinko pled guilty to manufacturing and possessing methamphetamine and was sentenced to concurrent 12-year terms.
- Under pre-2014 law, convictions for manufacturing or selling controlled substances other than marijuana rendered an offender ineligible for parole; this Court so held in McGovern and Turner.
- Despite those decisions, Mississippi DOC (MDOC) had for years classified many such offenders (including Sinko) as parole-eligible and assigned parole dates; the Parole Board granted parole to many.
- After a 2014 MDOC audit to conform to statutory interpretation, MDOC withdrew parole eligibility for Sinko and others; Sinko had a Parole Board action indicating parole on Sept. 22, 2014, before MDOC reversed course.
- House Bill 585 (effective July 1, 2014) amended both Miss. Code §§ 47-7-3 and 41-29-139(b), adding weight/unit-based amounts for all controlled substances and leaving the cross-reference in the parole statute to “amounts specified under § 41‑29‑139(b).”
- Sinko filed a PCR seeking reinstatement of his parole date (and alternatively that his sentence be set aside); the trial court denied relief. On appeal the Court of Appeals considered whether the 2014 amendments render Sinko parole-eligible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sinko) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PCR is proper vehicle to challenge parole-eligibility | PCR is a proper vehicle to challenge MDOC determination and to seek reinstatement of parole date | Agreed PCR is proper, but procedural defects exist in relief requested | Court: PCR is proper (citing Keys); will address merits despite waiver for judicial economy |
| Whether HB 585’s amendments make pre‑July 1, 2014 convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine parole‑eligible | Post‑July 1, 2014 amendments to § 41‑29‑139(b) now specify amounts for methamphetamine; § 47‑7‑3(f) refers to those amounts, so Sinko is not disqualified | Interpreting the statutes to make pre‑2014 offenders parole‑eligible is absurd; prior to July 1, 2014 indictments/sentencing did not list amounts, so MDOC cannot determine amounts—statutory cross‑reference should point to the pre‑amendment version | Court: Read statutes as amended together in HB 585; Sinko’s conviction does not render him ineligible for parole |
| Whether MDOC’s prior practice/‘cut‑off date’ violated equal protection or due process | MDOC’s selective reclassification using an arbitrary cut‑off date violated constitutional rights | State did not press constitutional resolution; court declined to address them because statutory grounds were dispositive | Court: Did not address constitutional claims; decided on statutory interpretation only |
| Whether Sinko’s plea was involuntary because court failed to advise him of parole ineligibility | Sinko contends plea was involuntary due to lack of parole ineligibility advice | State maintains plea was knowing and voluntary and that statutory interpretation controls eligibility | Court: Did not reach plea voluntariness claim; resolved case on statutory grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- McGovern v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 89 So. 3d 69 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (held offenders convicted of selling certain non‑marijuana controlled substances are ineligible for parole under prior statutory scheme)
- Keys v. State, 67 So. 3d 758 (Miss. 2011) (PCR is proper vehicle to challenge parole‑eligibility determinations)
- Turner v. State, 169 So. 3d 945 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (applies McGovern to sale of cocaine; offender held ineligible under pre‑2014 law)
- Belk v. Bean, 247 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1971) (canon regarding adoption of another statute as of its date of adoption)
- Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938) (federal canon that an adopting statute takes the adopted statute as of the time of adoption unless otherwise indicated)
- New York ex rel. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 556 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (explains limits of Hassett canon where both cross‑referencing and referenced provisions were amended together)
- Roberts v. Grisham, 493 So. 2d 940 (Miss. 1986) (courts will not read into a statute exceptions the legislature could have included)