Nathan Brock v. State of Indiana
2011 Ind. LEXIS 954
| Ind. | 2011Background
- Brock was HTV with lifetime license suspension; first trial ended in mistrial due to defense counsel's prejudicial closing arguments.
- State charged Brock with violating IC 9-30-10-17 and resisting law enforcement; first trial the only evidence was a redacted driving record.
- Defense argued there was no evidence that the prior conviction was under §16; trial court ruled there was a §16-based HTV lifetime suspension.
- Mistrial declared after repeated defense objections and defense comments, then jury discharged; Brock moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.
- Court of Appeals, and then Supreme Court granted transfer, holding no consent to mistrial and that manifest necessity supported retrial; second trial resulted in conviction on one count and acquittal on another.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brock consented to the mistrial | Brock tacitly consented by failing to object | Consent requires timely objection or explicit agreement | No explicit consent; no timely objection, but total circumstances did not show consent. |
| Whether the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity | Defense comments made mistrial necessary to protect fairness | Trial judge could manage prejudicial comments without mistrial | Yes, mistrial justified; not abuse of discretion. |
| Whether section 9-30-10-17 requires knowledge of life-forfeiture | State must prove knowledge of life-forfeiture | Section 17 is strict liability; no knowledge element | Section 17 is strict liability; knowledge not required. |
| Effect of evidence handling and admissibility on retrial | Redacted record could mislead without context | Prima facie evidence and record identification sufficient | Properly admitted or supported; did not bar retrial. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (manifest necessity standard for mistrials; public justice ends justify)
- Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (mistrial decisions depend on totality of circumstances; not automatic retrial)
- Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (clarifies that mistrial consequences depend on circumstances)
- Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (valued right to complete trial by first tribunal; may yield to public interest)
- United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (consent standards and contemporaneous objection rules for mistrial)
- United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (implied consent considerations in mistrial scenarios)
- Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant's silence can constitute tacit consent to mistrial; need opportunity to object)
- Gantley, 172 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1999) (implicit consent through conduct; considerations when no time to object)