Nathalia L. Brown v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services and Potomac Electrical Power Company
83 A.3d 739
| D.C. | 2014Background
- Nathalia Brown suffered electrical and fall injuries at work in 1995, causing permanent impairments to arms, legs, back, and neck and ending her ability to perform prior duties.
- PEPCO paid temporary total disability benefits and later offered vocational rehabilitation; Brown attended only half the sessions and refused a renewed light-duty job offer.
- An ALJ (Jan. 18, 2007) found Brown not totally disabled, concluded she unreasonably refused vocational rehabilitation, and ordered suspension of further benefits under D.C. Code § 32-1507(d). The CRB affirmed and Brown did not seek modification then.
- Brown later filed a new claim (2009) for permanent partial schedule benefits (arms/legs) and non‑schedule wage‑loss benefits (back/neck). An ALJ awarded both but ordered payments to run consecutively; the ALJ did not address suspension.
- On appeal the CRB sua sponte raised the 2007 suspension, vacated and remanded for the ALJ to determine whether the suspension still barred any award, and (alternatively) held that concurrent schedule and non‑schedule partial awards cannot exceed total‑disability compensation and therefore must run consecutively if concurrent payment would do so.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the CRB’s suspension holding and remanded for the Board to explain (1) its authority to raise the suspension sua sponte and (2) its view that reinstating suspended benefits requires a § 32-1524 modification given the statute’s deadlines; the court upheld the CRB’s consecutive‑payment rule for partial awards that would otherwise overcompensate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CRB permissibly raised a prior benefit‑suspension finding sua sponte on appeal | Brown: Board lacked authority to raise an issue not presented below and PEPCO didn’t cross‑appeal | PEPCO: (did not press suspension in this appeal) Board relied on prior order | Court: Remanded — Board must explain authority/discretion to raise forfeited issue and reconcile its own preservation rule |
| Whether a § 32-1507(d) suspension of benefits for refusal of vocational rehabilitation bars later claims for different types of benefits absent a § 32-1524 modification | Brown: The 2007 suspension of temporary benefits should not bar a later, separate claim for permanent partial benefits without modification | PEPCO: Suspension continues until claimant cooperates or obtains modification | Court: CRB’s interpret. that § 32-1507(d) suspends all benefits while refusal continues is reasonable and entitled to deference, but CRB must address whether requiring § 32-1524 modification (with its time limits) to lift suspension is appropriate; remand ordered for agency analysis |
| Whether requiring a § 32-1524 modification to lift a § 32-1507(d) suspension runs into the modification statute’s deadlines | Brown: Forcing modification may bar reinstatement because § 32-1524(a) deadlines may have expired | PEPCO/Board: Modification is the proper mechanism to revisit prior award | Court: Not resolved — remanded for CRB to analyze and reconcile potential tension between § 32-1507(d) and § 32-1524(a) |
| Whether schedule and non‑schedule permanent partial awards may be paid concurrently when their sum would exceed total‑disability compensation | Brown: Concurrent payment should be allowed | PEPCO/CRB: Concurrent payments that exceed total disability are impermissible; awards should run consecutively | Court: Affirmed CRB — concurrent payment that would exceed total disability cannot be allowed; awards must run consecutively in that circumstance |
Key Cases Cited
- Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (clarifies the limited use of the label "jurisdictional")
- Providence Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 855 A.2d 1108 (D.C. 2004) (agency must articulate reasoned basis to permit meaningful judicial review)
- Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 952 A.2d 168 (D.C. 2008) (discussing concurrent awards and remanding to CRB to analyze authorities)
- Smith v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 548 A.2d 95 (D.C. 1988) (schedule awards compensate anticipated wage loss and are not intended to depart from the wage‑loss principle)
- Ito Corp. v. Green, 185 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1999) (federal LHWCA principle: combined partial disability compensation should not exceed total disability compensation)