Natasha N. Clemons v. Thomas M. Knight
662 F. App'x 725
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- At ~9:30 p.m. deputies Shaw and Sasse stopped Rodney Mitchell for a seatbelt violation after a brief pursuit; Mitchell stopped with his jeep in drive and his foot on the brake.
- Sasse positioned himself near the front driver‑side of the jeep; Shaw stood at the driver’s door and ordered Mitchell to show his hands and shift to park.
- Mitchell briefly shifted to park, left his hand on the gearshift, then shifted back to drive and the vehicle lurched forward toward Sasse as Shaw reached across the driver toward the gearshift.
- Fearing he would be struck, Sasse fired two shots at the jeep and fell; Shaw then fired two shots; one bullet killed Mitchell and the jeep crashed into a building, injuring passenger Dorian Gilmer.
- Plaintiffs (Mitchell’s estate and Gilmer) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law, alleging excessive deadly force, failure to train/supervise, and vicarious liability against Sheriff Knight; district court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity and related claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputies' use of deadly force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment | Deputiffs shot without sufficient threat; witnesses and experts say vehicle did not move before shots | Deputies reasonably believed Mitchell used the jeep as a weapon and imminent danger existed to Sasse | Court held force was reasonable; qualified immunity for deputies affirmed |
| Whether factual disputes (witnesses’ timing and experts) preclude summary judgment | Witnesses heard shots before engine; experts say Sasse was out of harm’s way | Witness accounts were inconsistent or did not refute that the jeep moved before or during shots; experts did not create a material dispute about perceived danger | Court found the evidence, when viewed favorably to plaintiffs, still permitted reasonable officer inference of danger; no genuine issue of material fact |
| Whether Sheriff Knight is liable for inadequate training/supervision under § 1983 | Sheriff failed to implement policies/training to prevent excessive force | Deputies' actions were lawful, so no municipal liability for training/supervision | Court held no training/supervision liability because deputies did not violate constitutional rights |
| Whether Sheriff is vicariously liable under state law (battery/wrongful death) | Sheriff vicariously liable for deputies' torts | Deputies’ use of force not tortious; death not caused by wrongful act | Court held no vicarious liability because force was not excessive and death not wrongful under law |
Key Cases Cited
- Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (officer may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985) (constitutional limit on deadly force against fleeing suspects)
- Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2015) (use of force reasonable where officer faced an oncoming vehicle threat)
- Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (Fourth Amendment excessive force framework)
- Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding force where vehicle used or threatened as weapon)
- McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) (officers may act to dispel a threatened harm from a vehicle)
- Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 2015) (witness testimony inconsistency may fail to create a material factual dispute)
- Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (no municipal liability when there is no underlying constitutional violation)