377 F. Supp. 3d 49
D.D.C.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (deaf and hard-of-hearing) allege Harvard's online audiovisual content lacks captioning, denying meaningful access in violation of Title III of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
- Harvard moved for judgment on the pleadings seeking dismissal on multiple grounds: Title III does not cover web-only services absent a nexus to a physical place; Section 504 does not cover third-party content Harvard hosts; and the Communications Decency Act (§ 230) shields Harvard from liability for third-party content.
- The court recognizes a circuit split: First, Second, and Seventh Circuits interpret Title III to reach online/electronic facilities; Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth require a physical-place nexus.
- The complaint alleges Harvard both creates/produces some online content and makes other content available on Harvard-controlled platforms, and that Harvard’s administrative practices contribute to inaccessible captioning.
- The court treats Carparts (First Circuit) as binding, finds plaintiffs have plausibly alleged (and in the alternative pled a nexus) that some online content is tied to Harvard’s brick-and-mortar services, and declines judgment for Harvard on Title III and Section 504 claims at the pleading stage.
- The court holds § 230 shields Harvard as to embedded third‑party content and content that Harvard hosts but did not create or develop, but denies broad § 230 dismissal where the complaint plausibly alleges Harvard is responsible (in whole or part) for creating/developing the challenged content.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title III covers online-only services/websites | Title III’s public-accommodation rule extends beyond physical structures to electronic facilities; Harvard’s online content is a public accommodation | Title III requires a nexus to a physical place; Carparts didn’t eliminate a nexus requirement | Court follows Carparts; Title III can reach online content and Plaintiffs plausibly allege coverage (or sufficient nexus) to survive judgment on the pleadings |
| Whether plaintiffs pled a sufficient nexus between Harvard’s online content and its physical operations | Plaintiffs allege specific online offerings (lectures, courses, museum archives) tied to on-campus programs | Harvard disputes nexus and says web hosting alone is insufficient | Even if a nexus were required, plaintiffs have plausibly pled it for some content; denial of judgment on the pleadings |
| Whether Section 504 applies to third‑party content Harvard hosts | Plaintiffs allege Harvard uses policies/practices that result in inaccessible content and that some content was created by Harvard | Harvard relies on cases (Noel, Ivy) that limit liability for licensing/regulatory relationships and claims it merely furnishes hosting | Court finds DOE regulations and complaint allegations suffice to state a Section 504 claim at pleading stage; rejects Harvard’s narrow reading of DOE rules |
| Whether CDA § 230 bars claims for inaccessible third‑party content hosted or embedded on Harvard’s platforms | Plaintiffs argue § 230 doesn’t bar claims for failure to accommodate and that Harvard controls who posts | Harvard invokes § 230 immunity for being an interactive computer service hosting third‑party content or embedding external content | Court: § 230 applies broadly; Harvard is entitled to § 230 immunity (and judgment) as to embedded content and to third‑party content Harvard did not create/develop; but § 230 dismissal is premature where complaint plausibly alleges Harvard helped create/develop content or exercises content-provider functions |
Key Cases Cited
- Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n of New England, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.) (Title III reaches beyond mere physical access)
- Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (Title III protects more than physical access; service practices can be covered)
- Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title III’s core prohibits excluding disabled from facilities including electronic ones)
- Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (Title III requires connection to a physical place)
- Lycos, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) (§ 230 analysis; immunity requires defendant be treated as publisher of third‑party content)
- Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) (broad § 230 immunity; publisher/editorial functions protected)
- Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (applied § 230 to claims including housing discrimination)