Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075

Nash, a Wisconsin prisoner, challenges trial counsel’s effectiveness for advising a no-contest plea to sexual assault of a child.
The district court denied federal habeas relief, ruling Nash procedurally defaulted his claim.
Nash did not appeal the denial of habeas relief.
Nash later sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment, which the district court denied.
Nash’s fugitive status arose after the district court decision; Wisconsin postconviction procedures could have reinstated his rights but Nash did not pursue them.
Wisconsin procedures allow reinstatement of postconviction and appeal rights if the initial counsel’s omission is corrected, but Nash did not pursue reinstatement even after the court advised him how.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available for postjudgment relief due to new law.	Nash argues Maples, Martinez, Trevino create extraordinary circumstances.	The law change is not an extraordinary circumstance and cannot justify relief.	No; changes in law do not constitute extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6).
Whether Wisconsin procedural options could excuse Nash’s default.	Nash could reinstate postconviction rights under Wisconsin procedure.	Nash’s default was his own fault for not pursuing reinstatement.	No; Nash’s default is attributable to him, not excused by new authorities.
Whether Martinez and Trevino apply to Wisconsin’s procedure to excuse default.	Martinez and Trevino could excuse default due to ineffective postconviction counsel.	Wisconsin provides a straightforward route to pursue postconviction relief; Nash did not use it.	No direct call; Wisconsin procedure remained available and Nash did not utilize it.

Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel can excuse procedural default when counsel abandons petitioner without notice)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can excuse default when state law requires collateral review for such claims)
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (applies Martinez to states that make trial-counsel claims virtually unraiseable on direct appeal)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (change in law after judgment is not extraordinary; Rule 60(b)(6) not for reconsidering wrong judgment)
Hill v. Rios, 722 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2013) (post-judgment changes in law not extraordinary)
Norgaard v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 1997) (post-judgment developments do not qualify as extraordinary)
Evans, 682 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 2004) (Wisconsin procedure to reinstate postconviction rights after counsel’s omission)
Walker, 716 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 2006) (Wisconsin guidance on reinstating postconviction rights)