480 P.3d 842
N.M.2020Background
- Two consolidated New Mexico cases (Belen Consolidated School District v. County of Valencia and Nash v. Board of County Commissioners of Catron County) involved quiet-title suits that named counties as defendants.
- Counties moved to dismiss under NMSA 1978 § 42-11-1, a 1979 statute granting immunity to the State and political subdivisions from being named in suits affecting title or interest in real property.
- Plaintiffs argued § 42-6-12 (enacted 1947) waived immunity and, after this Court’s abolition of common-law sovereign immunity (Hicks/Brosseau), § 42-6-12 should be construed broadly to permit quiet-title actions against government.
- The Court of Appeals held counties are immune and that no applicable waiver permitted the suits; plaintiffs sought certiorari.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: it treated § 42-11-1 as a lawful, broad statutory grant of immunity and upheld Maes’s narrow construction of § 42-6-12 as a limited waiver; the Court declined to decide plaintiffs’ underdeveloped due-process/takings arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counties may be named in quiet-title suits despite § 42-11-1 immunity | § 42-6-12 waives immunity and, in light of Brosseau, should be read to allow quiet-title suits against government | § 42-11-1 (1979) lawfully reimposed statutory immunity; plaintiffs’ reading of § 42-6-12 is overbroad | Held: Counties immune under § 42-11-1; § 42-6-12 is not a broad waiver permitting quiet-title suits against counties |
| Whether Maes’s narrow interpretation of § 42-6-12 should be overruled/expanded post-Brosseau | Maes should be revisited; Brosseau’s abolition of common-law immunity supports a broad waiver | Maes’s construction reflects original legislative intent and remains binding; statutes are reconcilable | Held: Declined to overrule Maes; § 42-6-12 remains a limited waiver consistent with the 1947 bill title and legislative intent |
| Whether due process / takings principles require allowing quiet-title when inverse condemnation may be impractical or time-barred | Denying quiet-title leaves plaintiffs without remedy and may violate due process/takings protections | Inverse condemnation is the proper/exclusive remedy; immunity standing alone does not present a fully developed constitutional deprivation here | Held: Court declined to address the undeveloped constitutional due-process/takings claim and remanded no relief against counties |
Key Cases Cited
- Maes v. Old Lincoln Cnty. Mem'l Comm'n, 64 N.M. 475, 330 P.2d 556 (construed § 42-6-12 as a limited waiver to aid mortgage foreclosure marketability)
- Brosseau v. N.M. State Highway Dep't, 92 N.M. 328, 587 P.2d 1339 (recognized abolition of common-law sovereign immunity as applied to quiet-title suits)
- Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (abolished common-law sovereign immunity broadly)
- Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc. v. N.M. Health & Env't Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 830 P.2d 145 (courts must honor legislatively imposed statutory immunity)
- Townsend v. State ex rel. State Highway Dep't, 117 N.M. 302, 871 P.2d 958 (inverse condemnation is the exclusive remedy for takings/damages)
- Mesich v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of McKinley Cnty., 46 N.M. 412, 129 P.2d 974 (property owners have inverse-condemnation remedy against government takings)
- United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (Takings Clause reasonably covers state and local government property)