Nash v. Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, 1:14-cv-00246

Background

Charles Nash was convicted in 2007 by a Hamilton County jury of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery; sentence: life plus concurrent 25 years.
On direct appeal Nash challenged only denial of suppression of his police statement; Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) affirmed; Tennessee Supreme Court denied review.
Nash filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (failure to pursue suppression, failure to object to prosecutor’s closing, failure to develop/seek instruction on duress); the post-conviction court denied relief and the TCCA affirmed.
Nash filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising suppression, multiple ineffective-assistance claims, and prosecutorial-misconduct claims; respondent moved to dismiss several claims as procedurally defaulted.
The district court applied AEDPA deference and found many claims procedurally defaulted; on the merits it rejected Nash’s suppression (Miranda/Davis) claim and all remaining ineffective-assistance and appellate-counsel claims; denied habeas relief and refused a COA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural default of many claims	Nash: various trial and prosecutorial-misconduct claims were properly presented and merit review	State: Nash failed to properly raise these claims on direct or post-conviction appeal; thus defaulted	Court: Majority of listed claims procedurally defaulted and dismissed
Suppression of police statement (Miranda invocation)	Nash: he unequivocally invoked right to counsel (“it ain’t possible that I could have a lawyer?”) so later statements must be suppressed	State: the question was equivocal; Nash then said he wanted to speak and police clarified he could; interrogation law allows continued questioning unless a clear request is made	Court: Nash’s remark was equivocal per Davis standard; confession admissible; suppression denied
Ineffective assistance re: failure to seek suppression under Seibert (pre‑Miranda questioning)	Nash: counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress because detectives questioned him in the car before Miranda (Seibert)	State: post-conviction court found Nash not credible that he told counsel about pre‑Miranda admissions; counsel not deficient	Court: AEDPA deference to state credibility findings; no relief granted
Ineffective assistance re: failure to object to prosecutor’s closing / failure to present duress / appellate counsel omission	Nash: counsel should have objected to inflammatory closing and presented duress, and appellate counsel should have raised misconduct on appeal	State: counsel addressed emotional arguments in defense closing (strategic); duress not supported by evidence (not imminent/continuous); appellate failure was not prejudicial	Court: counsel’s strategy reasonable; duress legally unavailable on facts; appellate counsel not deficient; claims denied

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires advising suspects of Fifth Amendment rights)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once right to counsel asserted, further interrogation requires counsel present unless initiated by suspect)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (a suspect’s equivocal remarks about counsel do not invoke Edwards protection)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (midstream Miranda warnings after pre‑warning interrogation may not cure coercion; pre‑ and post‑statements can be suppressed)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default bar; cause and prejudice required to excuse default)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; petitioner must overcome doubly deferential standard)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (deference to state court credibility findings in habeas proceedings)