Naruto v. David Slater
888 F.3d 418
9th Cir.2018Background
- Naruto, a crested macaque in Sulawesi, allegedly took several photographs with David Slater’s unattended camera; Slater and Wildlife published the photos and claimed copyright ownership.
- PETA (with a researcher, Dr. Antje Engelhardt, initially) sued Slater, Wildlife, and Blurb as "next friends" on behalf of Naruto for copyright infringement; Engelhardt later withdrew and PETA remained as next friend on appeal.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing and for lack of statutory standing under the Copyright Act; the district court dismissed for lack of statutory standing.
- The Ninth Circuit panel (applying binding precedent) held animals can meet Article III standing (per Cetacean) but concluded animals lack statutory standing under the Copyright Act because the statute does not plainly authorize suits by animals.
- The court also held PETA likely failed to establish next-friend standing (no significant relationship with Naruto) and expressed strong skepticism about permitting organizations to represent animals; nevertheless the panel proceeded to the Copyright Act merits.
- The panel affirmed the dismissal of Naruto’s copyright claim and awarded appellate attorneys’ fees to Slater and Wildlife.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing | Naruto (via PETA) has concrete economic injury from infringement; Cetacean supports animals having Article III standing | Defendants argued animals cannot be parties and thus lack Article III standing | Panel applied Cetacean: animals can have Article III standing; Naruto met Article III standing here |
| Next‑friend standing (PETA’s role) | PETA claimed authority to sue as Naruto’s next friend to vindicate his rights | Defendants argued PETA lacked the required significant relationship and animals cannot be represented by next friends under Rule 17 | Court doubted PETA satisfied next‑friend requirements and held animals generally cannot be next‑friend litigants; nonetheless proceeded to merits because Article III standing existed independently |
| Statutory standing under the Copyright Act | PETA argued the Act allows nonhuman plaintiffs implicitly (corporations/unincorporated associations can sue) | Defendants argued the Copyright Act does not plainly authorize animals to sue; statutory text and scheme presuppose human persons and heirs | Held: animals (including Naruto) lack statutory standing under the Copyright Act because Congress did not plainly authorize suits by animals |
| Attorneys’ fees | N/A (defendants sought fees) | Defendants sought fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 as prevailing parties | Court granted appellate attorneys’ fees to Slater and Wildlife and remanded amount to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (held animals may, in some circumstances, show Article III standing but lack statutory standing where statutes do not plainly authorize suits by animals)
- Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (explains narrow, historical limits of next‑friend standing and burden on next friend to justify jurisdiction)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (articulates Article III standing requirements and injury‑in‑fact doctrine)
- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (panels are bound by prior circuit precedent)
- Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (applied next‑friend standing limits and dismissed when next‑friend standing not shown)
- Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (authorizes discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing party under Copyright Act)