110 A.3d 1160
R.I.2015Background
- The Narragansett Indian Tribe filed suit challenging the 2011 Casino Act as facially unconstitutional under article 6, § 15 of the Rhode Island Constitution and for vagueness and non-delegation defects; UTGR (Twin River) intervened.
- The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the State and UTGR, finding the Tribe had standing but failed to show the Act was facially unconstitutional.
- This Court previously affirmed the Tribe’s standing in Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106 (R.I. 2014).
- The appeal presented only a facial challenge to the statute; the Tribe’s as-applied challenge remained pending in Superior Court.
- The Tribe argued the Act was unconstitutionally vague and improperly delegated state power to private operators, in violation of article 6, §§ 1, 2 and § 15 (lotteries) of the Rhode Island Constitution.
- The Supreme Court reviewed de novo, noting the heavy presumption of constitutionality and that facial challenges require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Casino Act is unconstitutionally vague on its face | The Act’s terms are too indefinite to govern conduct and invite arbitrary enforcement | Vagueness claims not implicating First Amendment must be evaluated as-applied; no facial vagueness shown | Court: Vagueness must be assessed as-applied here; facial vagueness not established |
| Whether the Casino Act unlawfully delegates state authority to private entities (non-delegation/operation requirement under art. 6, § 15) | The Act permits disproportionate delegation to private operators, undermining the requirement that lotteries be "state-operated" | The Act vests broad operational control in the State ("full operational control" and power to determine number/type/placement of games and to suspend/terminate activities); enumerations are non-exhaustive and consistent with state operation | Court: Not facially invalid; statutory language and powers (including termination/suspension) show state operational control, and hypothetical misuses do not defeat statute facially |
| Whether prior advisory opinions or copied language render the Act constitutionally infirm | Portions taken from advisory opinions replicate earlier defects | Adoption of advisory-language alone does not make statute invalid absent identified constitutional deficiency | Court: Advisory-language not determinative; no specific infirmity shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106 (R.I. 2014) (earlier standing decision)
- In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Casino), 856 A.2d 320 (R.I. 2004) (advisory opinion discussing operator identity concerns)
- In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives (Casino II), 885 A.2d 698 (R.I. 2005) (advisory opinion addressing private control over table games)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (facial challenges disfavored; do not decide on hypothetical cases)
- Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (statute invalid under some conceivable circumstances is insufficient for facial invalidation)
- Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (vagueness challenges not implicating First Amendment are evaluated as-applied)
- State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger, 44 A.3d 1218 (R.I. 2012) (void-for-vagueness/doctrine and presumption of constitutionality)