NANTICOKE LENNI-LENAPE TRIBAL NATION VS. JOHN J. HOFFMAN, ETC. (L-2343-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-2756-15T1
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.Jul 10, 2017Background
- Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape (the Tribe) sued New Jersey Acting Attorney General John Hoffman after alleging the State repudiated prior recognition of the Tribe and thereby caused loss of federal benefits tied to state recognition.
- Tribe alleges New Jersey adopted a concurrent resolution in 1982 recognizing it and that the State and federal agencies thereafter treated the Tribe as state-recognized for purposes of federal benefits (e.g., Indian Arts & Crafts Act, HHS programs, Census representation).
- The complaint cites later state actions that reinforced recognition: a 1992 statute (N.J.S.A. 26:8-49) referring to the three NJ tribes; creation of the Commission on Native American Affairs in 1995 (N.J.S.A. 52:16A-53); gubernatorial and agency statements acknowledging three recognized tribes; and federal agency reliance on those representations.
- Plaintiff alleges state employees and agencies later denied or undermined that recognition (letters to federal agencies, statements to GAO), and the Attorney General failed to retract those denials, causing loss of benefits and other harms.
- The trial court dismissed under R. 4:6-2(e), reasoning the State never granted recognition by statute and thus could not have repudiated recognition; the Appellate Division reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint plausibly alleges the State granted "recognition" sufficient to qualify the Tribe for federal benefits | The 1982 concurrent resolution, later statutes, agency pronouncements, and State practice effected recognition that federal agencies accepted and conferred benefits | State recognition requires a statute; non‑statutory acts (concurrent resolution, pronouncements) did not create recognition, so there was nothing to repudiate | Reversed: court must accept plaintiff's factual allegations; whether recognition existed for federal purposes is governed by federal standards and cannot be dismissed as a matter of law on this record |
| Whether the motion court erred by treating a statute as the only means of state recognition for federal benefits | Plaintiff: federal agencies use flexible criteria; state recognition can take varied forms and need not be by statute | Defendant: only a statute confers legally effective recognition under NJ constitutional/lawmaking rules | Held for plaintiff on procedural sufficiency: trial court prematurely decided statutory‑only rule without applying federal standards or accepting pleaded facts |
| Whether federal standards control the question of what state acts constitute recognition for federal benefit eligibility | Plaintiff: eligibility depends on whether federal agencies accepted the State's characterization; federal standards therefore govern | Defendant: characterization of state recognition is a state law matter requiring statute | Court: Federal standards determine whether state action suffices for federal benefits; dismissal was premature without applying those standards |
| Whether dismissal under R. 4:6-2(e) was appropriate | Plaintiff: complaint alleges ongoing receipt of federal benefits based on state recognition and subsequent repudiation — adequate to survive dismissal | Defendant: claims rest on false premise (no state recognition), so pleadings fail as a matter of law | Appellate court: dismissal improper because complaint's factual allegations must be accepted and federal acceptance standards considered; remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, 140 N.J. 623 (trial-court dismissal requires accepting complaint allegations as true)
- Printing Mart–Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (complaint construed liberally; courts should search in depth for a cause of action)
- Major v. Maguire, 224 N.J. 1 (liberal pleading interpretation; leave to amend when claims are obscure)
- Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431 (de novo review of R. 4:6-2(e); inquiry limited to face of complaint)
- Smerling v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., 389 N.J. Super. 181 (App. Div. standard for reviewing dismissals under R. 4:6-2(e))
