118 F. Supp. 3d 372
D.D.C.2015Background
- In 1963 Guinea and Harvey Aluminum (Halco) entered the CBG Convention, which reserves to Guinea a qualified right to ship up to 50% of exported bauxite subject to market-rate freight terms.
- Guinea later executed a Technical Assistance Agreement with Nanko Shipping Guinea that plaintiffs say assigned Guinea’s Article 9 shipping rights to Nanko; the Agreement itself was not filed.
- Plaintiffs (Nanko Shipping Guinea, Nanko Shipping USA, and Mr. Mori Diane) sued Alcoa (and sought to add Halco) alleging breach of third‑party beneficiary rights under the Convention and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; a § 1985 conspiracy claim depended on the § 1981 claim.
- The Court dismissed: (1) for failure to join the Republic of Guinea as an indispensable party under Rule 19 (Guinea’s interests would be impaired by interpretation of the Convention and Guinea is immune from suit), and (2) the § 1981 claim for failure to plead purposeful race discrimination; the § 1985 claim was dismissed as derivative.
- Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration arguing clear error/manifest injustice; they did not present new evidence or law. The Court denied reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Republic of Guinea is a necessary/indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 | Guinea is not indispensable; the case can be resolved by reference only to the Technical Assistance Agreement without construing the Convention | Resolution requires interpretation of the Convention (source of the shipping rights); adjudication could impair Guinea’s rights and Guinea cannot be joined due to sovereign immunity | Guinea is an indispensable party because adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims requires interpreting the Convention; dismissal proper where Guinea cannot be joined in equity under Rule 19(b) |
| Whether arbitration eliminates need for Rule 19 analysis | Arbitration is not mandatory for Nanko because it did not expressly agree to the Convention | Regardless of arbitration, Rule 19 analysis controls; arbitration available as an adequate alternative remedy | Availability of arbitration supports dismissal in equity but is not the primary basis—the indispensable‑party deficiency remains dispositive |
| Whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded intentional race discrimination under § 1981 | Allegations that Mr. Diane and Nanko are Black and were treated differently suffice to state a § 1981 claim | § 1981 requires purposeful discrimination and plaintiffs pleaded only conclusory/racial-identity allegations without facts showing race was the reason | § 1981 claim dismissed for failure to plead purposeful discrimination; § 1985 dismissed as derivative |
| Whether the court should grant reconsideration (Rule 59(e)) | Court made clear legal errors regarding indispensability and § 1981, producing manifest injustice | No intervening change in law or new evidence; judgment was not ‘dead wrong’; motion is reargument of prior rulings | Reconsideration denied: plaintiffs did not show clear error or manifest injustice |
Key Cases Cited
- Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (standard for Rule 59(e) reconsideration)
- Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (grounds for reconsideration)
- Parts & Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing how final judgments must be ‘dead wrong’ to constitute clear error)
- Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (motion for reconsideration is not opportunity to raise new issues that could have been raised earlier)
- Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1982) (§ 1981 requires purposeful discrimination)
- Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (§ 1981 does not cover unintentional disparate treatment)