Nancy Webb, Peggy Whipple and Sharon Bramblett v. Arturo Martinez, Jr.
04-16-00042-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 14, 2016Background
- In 1998 appellants (Webb, Whipple, Bramblett) executed a deed conveying the entire surface estate but containing a reservation clause: “75% of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals presently owned by [appellants], in and under and that may be produced from the herein described property.”
- The parties dispute whether that clause reserved 75% of the entire mineral estate or 75% of appellants’ preexisting 75% mineral interest (i.e., whether the deed reserved 75% of a 75% interest or 100% of their 75% interest).
- In 2010 appellants executed an oil-and-gas lease and later learned a third party (noted in record reservations) owned 25% of the minerals; Chesapeake withheld payments, prompting the dispute over appellants’ reserved interest.
- Appellants sued Martinez in 2013 seeking declaratory relief that the deed reserved 100% of their 75% interest and, alternatively, reformation and quiet title based on mutual mistake (alleging a scrivener’s error); Martinez moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted a take‑nothing summary judgment for Martinez; the court of appeals affirmed, holding the deed unambiguously reserved 75% of appellants’ 75% interest and that reformation/quiet-title claims were time‑barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Construction of the reservation clause (did the deed reserve 100% of appellants’ 75% interest or only 75% of that interest?) | The deed should be read to reserve 100% of appellants’ 75% interest; reservation language and “reservations of record” support that reading | The plain language reserves 75% of the minerals “presently owned by [appellants],” which in 1998 equaled a 75% interest, so the reservation is 75% of that 75% | The deed is unambiguous and reserves 75% of appellants’ 75% interest; no parol evidence allowed to vary it |
| Use of parol evidence to reform the deed | Parol or extrinsic evidence (contract of sale, parties’ intent) shows a mutual mistake and supports reformation to reflect 100% of their 75% interest | Parol evidence cannot vary an unambiguous deed; the instrument’s four corners control | Because the reservation is unambiguous, the court refused to consider extrinsic evidence to alter the deed |
| Timeliness of quiet-title and reformation claims (statute of limitations) | The claims accrued later or discovery rule should apply because injury was not known until lease/withheld payments | Claims accrued on deed execution (facially valid instrument); four-year limitations bar applies and discovery rule does not apply to parties to the deed | Claims accrued on execution (Oct. 8, 1998); suit filed Aug. 5, 2013, beyond four-year limitations period; reformation and quiet-title claims are time‑barred |
Key Cases Cited
- City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Express-News, 47 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) (summary judgment reviewed de novo)
- Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (traditional summary judgment standard)
- Harriss v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1955) (parol evidence inadmissible to vary unambiguous deed reservation)
- Kardell v. Acker, 492 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016) (deed construction governed by the four corners to ascertain intent)
- W. 17th Res., LLC v. Pawelek, 482 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015) (deeds construed to confer the greatest estate the instrument will permit; presumption favoring grantees)
- Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2015) (reformation accrual/mistake rule and limitations)
- In re Stroud Oil Props., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002) (quiet-title claim accrues on execution of a facially valid instrument)
- In re Estate of Denman, 362 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011) (defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations must prove accrual date and that suit was filed outside the limitations period)