Nancy Roell v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs
870 F.3d 471
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Gary Roell, a long‑time sufferer of schizoaffective disorder, experienced excited delirium after stopping medication, damaged property, and went to a neighbor’s condo carrying a garden hose with a metal nozzle and a hanging plant.
- Hamilton County deputies Alexander, Dalid, and Huddleston responded to a “neighbor trouble” call, confronted Roell, struggled physically with him, deployed a Taser multiple times (including drive‑stun and dart modes), handcuffed and shackled him; Roell later stopped breathing and died.
- The county coroner ruled the manner of death natural, caused by excited delirium; the report noted contusions, Taser barb injuries, and rib fractures but concluded they did not cause death.
- Roell’s executrix (Nancy Roell) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and municipal liability) and Title II of the ADA (intentional discrimination and failure‑to‑accommodate), plus state claims.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the individual deputies on qualified immunity grounds and to Hamilton County on the § 1983 and ADA claims; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputies used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment | Roell was mentally ill; deputies should have de‑escalated and adjusted force downward; their physical restraint and Taser use were excessive | Deputies faced exigent circumstances, Roell posed a threat and actively resisted; force was objectively reasonable | Affirmed qualified immunity — court found force likely reasonable and, in any event, not clearly unconstitutional under existing precedent |
| Whether deputies are entitled to qualified immunity | N/A (plaintiff bears burden to show right was clearly established) | Deputies: no clearly established law made their conduct unlawful in this context | Held: no clearly established precedent put deputies on notice that their conduct was unlawful; qualified immunity applies |
| Whether Hamilton County is liable under § 1983 (policy, training, or ratification) | County lacked adequate policies/training on mentally ill persons and ratified the deputies via an inadequate investigation | County had appropriate training (use‑of‑force, taser, crisis intervention, recognizing excited delirium) and conducted a thorough internal investigation | Affirmed — no municipal liability: plaintiff failed to identify a county policy or deliberate indifference in training or a defective investigation |
| Whether Title II ADA failure‑to‑accommodate or intentional discrimination claim survives | County should have required de‑escalation, information gathering, and EMS before force; failure to accommodate disability | Even if ADA applies to arrests, exigent circumstances made requested accommodations unreasonable; no evidence of intentional discrimination | Affirmed — failure‑to‑accommodate unreasonable under exigent circumstances; no intentional discrimination shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (use of force judged by objective‑reasonableness test)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (totality of circumstances in seizure analysis)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework; two‑step inquiry)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity protects officials from suit absent clearly established rights)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (discussion of particularized clearly established inquiry)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (clearly established law standard)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity where legal contours are "hazy border")
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (municipal liability for failure to train requires deliberate indifference)
- Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (officers must account for diminished capacity of mentally impaired arrestees)
- Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951 (declining to inflict severe force on unarmed, mentally unstable person; de‑escalation and reduced force required)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (use of taser characterized as intermediate force)