Nalls & Melvin v. State, 89 A.3d 1126

Defendant Nalls was convicted at a bench trial of second-degree rape, third-degree sexual offense, and second-degree assault; his waiver of a jury trial was not explicitly announced as knowing and voluntary by the trial judge.
Melvin waived his right to a jury trial at a status conference; the judge stated he “knowingly, intelligently waived” the right, but with a potential slip of the tongue.
Both cases were reviewed in light of Valonis v. State, which held Rule 4-246(b) requires a two-step process: a waiver colloquy and an explicit on-record determination and announcement that the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily.
Nalls and Melvin challenged whether the trial courts complied with Rule 4-246(b) and whether lack of objection barred appellate review.
This opinion clarifies preservation standards and rejects harmless/error-review for non-compliance; it remands Nails’s conviction for third-degree sexual offense as to sufficiency of evidence and reverses the judgments in part, directing new bench trials with costs.
The Court previously held in Valonis that noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reversible; this opinion limits review to preserved issues, disavowing any broad exception for unpreserved waiver issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What constitutes compliance with Rule 4-246(b)?	Nalls and Melvin argue the courts failed to announce knowing and voluntary waivers.	State contends Rule 4-246(b) was followed or that error is harmless.	Trial judges failed to comply with both prongs of Rule 4-246(b).
Does lack of contemporaneous objection bar appellate review under retained discretion in Valonis?	Valonis created a potential exception to preservation.	State argues standard preservation rules apply.	Contemporaneous objection is required to preserve review; Valonis limited to its two cases and is disavowed as a general rule.
What is the appropriate sanction for Rule 4-246(b) noncompliance?	Remand or harmless error analysis may be appropriate.	Noncompliance should be reversible; limited remand is impractical.	Reversal is the appropriate sanction; limited remand is improper.
Is Nails’s conviction for third-degree sexual offense supported by the evidence?	Evidence showed penile penetration; supports conviction.	Statutory definition of sexual contact excludes penile penetration as per 2002 law.	Evidence insufficient to sustain third-degree sexual offense; conviction vacated.

Valonis v. State, 431 Md. 551 (2013) (requires explicit on-record determination and announcement under Md. Rule 4-246(b) and holds noncompliance reversible)
Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124 (1987) (waiver must be knowing and voluntary; not coerced; knowledge of right required)
Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28 (1991) (waiver must be knowing and voluntary; separate from voluntariness)
Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365 (2003) (waiver of jury trial must be on the record; defendant’s election must be intentional)
Bell v. State, 66 Md.App. 294 (1986) (record should affirmatively show compliance; failure to object not grounds to dismiss appeal)
Bayne v. State, 98 Md.App. 149 (1993) (definition of sexual contact; penile penetration may not constitute sexual contact under the statute)
Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165 (2002) (illustrates potential slip of the tongue vs. true change of mind in waiver contexts)