Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water District, 821 F.3d 134

Background

Najas Realty (developer) purchased 10 acres in Seekonk, MA to build a 10-lot subdivision (Pine Hill); Petra Building is the affiliated builder.
Seekonk Water District Superintendent Robert Bernardo repeatedly voiced concerns at public board meetings that the proposed subdivision could increase nitrate contamination near Town well GP-4 and cause health risks (e.g., "Blue Baby Syndrome").
The Board of Health required and then approved a nitrate loading analysis; the Planning Board initially denied the plan, the parties settled reducing lots from ten to nine, and the Planning Board later approved the revised plan. The Water District petitioned to rescind or modify the approval but the Planning Board denied that petition.
Plaintiffs alleged a campaign of defamatory, retaliatory conduct by Bernardo and the Water District to thwart their development and claimed financial losses; they sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process) and Massachusetts analogues, plus tortious interference.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The district court dismissed the contested counts and denied leave to amend the equal protection claim; plaintiffs appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
First Amendment retaliation (petition & speech)	Najas' application and advocacy were protected petitioning/speech; Bernardo retaliated by opposing and delaying approval/connection, causing damages	Bernardo's objections were government speech by an official fulfilling duties and reflected genuine public-health concerns, not retaliation	Dismissed: plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead causation or that Bernardo's statements were knowingly baseless; government-speech considerations weigh against retaliation claim
Equal protection (class-of-one)	Defendants singled out plaintiffs for unique, malicious treatment without rational basis	No plausible bad faith/malice; plaintiffs did not identify similarly situated comparators with required detail	Dismissed: complaint rehashed retaliation theory, failed to plead comparators or malice; denial of leave to amend not an abuse of discretion
Substantive due process	Plaintiffs were deprived of life/liberty/property by conscience-shocking government action	Dispute was routine land-use disagreement; no loss of property or extreme official conduct	Dismissed: plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable deprivation and no conscience-shocking behavior was alleged
Tortious interference (state law)	Bernardo's statements and actions maliciously interfered with business relations	Public-officer immunity protects officials acting in good faith without malice; plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege malice	Dismissed: public-officer immunity applies because allegations do not show bad faith or malice

Key Cases Cited

Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir.) (standard for taking pleadings as true on Rule 12(c))
Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim)
Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.) (government officials’ speech on public matters and retaliation analysis)
Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122 (1st Cir.) (defining public concern for speech analysis)
S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir.) (conclusory allegations insufficient to plead plausibility)
Snyder v. Gaudet, 756 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.) (class-of-one equal protection framework)
Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir.) (bad faith or malicious intent required for class-of-one land-use equal protection claim)
Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107 (1st Cir.) (substantive due process requires conscience-shocking government action)
Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for denial of leave to amend)
Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.) (pleading comparators in class-of-one claims required beyond conclusory assertions)