280 A.3d 653
Md.2022Background
- Nagle & Zaller, P.C., a law firm, drafted promissory notes containing confessed-judgment clauses and pursued confessed-judgment actions on behalf of homeowner associations (HOAs) to collect delinquent HOA assessments.
- Plaintiffs (Delegall et al.) sued, alleging among other claims that the law firm and HOAs were "lenders" under the Maryland Consumer Loan Law (MCLL) and therefore required to be licensed; Count VIII asserted promissory notes were void and uncollectible because no license existed.
- The federal district court certified the question whether a law firm that prepares such notes and files confessed-judgment complaints is subject to the MCLL.
- Maryland Court of Appeals examined statute text, legislative history, and purpose, and accepted the Complaint’s factual allegations for the certified question.
- The Court distinguished the MCLL (an industry-focused licensing scheme) from the broader Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), noting Goshen Run prohibits confessed-judgment clauses under the MCPA but does not by itself show the MCLL was meant to regulate law firms or HOAs.
- Holding: the MCLL applies to persons "in the business of making loans" (consumer-lending industry); a law firm performing debt-collection/legal services for an HOA and an HOA offering payment plans are not, solely by those activities, subject to MCLL licensing requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a law firm that drafts promissory notes with confessed-judgment clauses and files confessed-judgment actions is subject to the MCLL licensing/credit provisions | Delegall: the promissory notes are extensions of consumer credit; the firm "made" loans by drafting notes, collecting payments, and suing — thus qualifies as a "lender" required to be licensed | Nagle & Zaller: MCLL governs persons "in the business of making loans" (consumer-lending industry); law firms and HOAs are not in that business and licensing was not intended to reach routine legal/collection services | Held: No — MCLL targets the consumer-lending industry. A law firm providing legal/collection services for clients (and an HOA offering payment plans) is not necessarily a "lender" "in the business of making loans." |
| Whether the broad statutory definition of "loan" compels MCLL coverage of these transactions | Delegall: textual breadth means any advance of credit ≤ $25,000 is within MCLL regardless of actor | Nagle & Zaller: read in context, definitions must be harmonized with licensing scheme and legislative purpose to regulate lenders, not incidental actors | Held: Text construed in context and with legislative history; a literal expansion to all advances would yield absurd results and render "in the business" language meaningless, so MCLL does not reach incidental actors like law firms/HOAs here |
| Whether other consumer statutes leave these transactions unregulated if MCLL does not apply | Delegall: concerns that permitting the firm to escape MCLL creates a regulatory gap | Nagle & Zaller: other statutes (MCPA, MCDCA, FDCPA, HOA/Condominium Acts) and professional rules regulate abusive collection practices | Held: Court relied on those other remedies (e.g., Goshen Run under MCPA, federal/state debt-collection laws) to show regulation exists even if MCLL does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Goshen Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 223 A.3d 917 (Md. 2020) (promissory note with confessed-judgment clause is an extension of consumer credit for MCPA purposes; confessed-judgment clauses prohibited)
- Andrews & Lawrence Professional Servs., LLC v. Mills, 223 A.3d 947 (Md. 2020) (professional-services exemption does not shield attorneys from consumer-debt-collection rules when they engage in collection activity subject to licensing/statutory prohibition)
- Commissioner of Financial Regulation v. Brown, Brown & Brown, P.C., 144 A.3d 666 (Md. 2016) (law firm may be subject to consumer-credit/credit-services regulation where facts show regular credit-related activity)
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1995) (FDCPA can apply to attorneys who regularly attempt to collect consumer debts through litigation)
