Nader v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
87 So. 3d 712
| Fla. | 2012Background
- Florida implied-consent statute 316.1932(l)(a)1.a. authorizes breath tests following lawful arrest and warns that refusal may suspend driving privileges.
- Nader refused a breath test after a traffic-stop/sobriety examination and received a one-year license suspension.
- Nader challenged the notice and the form affidavit used to certify the refusal, arguing it referred to breath, urine, or blood instead of breath-only as required.
- The circuit court granted certiorari relief, relying on Clark (4th DCA) which allowed reversal where warnings misled the driver.
- The Second District disagreed with Clark, holding the warning language did not mislead and that the circuit court departed from clearly established statutory law.
- This opinion answers certified questions: (1) whether the refusal warning violated implied-consent law; (2) the scope of second-tier certiorari review of circuit-court decisions reviewing administrative orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the implied-consent warning violate 316.1932(l)(a)1.a. when it says breath, blood, or urine? | Nader argues Clark misled by broad ‘breath, urine, or blood’ language. | Department contends form complies with statute and Clark is unwarranted. | No violation; warning language is not misleading. |
| May a district court grant certiorari relief for a circuit-court decision reviewing an administrative order when precedent from another district controls? | Nader/Department contend circuit court erred by following Clark and thus violated statutory language. | Clark misapplied the statute; the circuit court departed from clearly established law. | Yes; district court may grant second-tier certiorari to correct departure from clearly established law, even if based on another district precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hayes, Not provided () (invalid entry; placeholder to be replaced with authoritative citation if needed)
- Clark v. State, 974 So.2d 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (warning about breath, blood, or urine testing can mislead—court relied on it against)
- Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2003) (second-tier certiorari reserved for clearly established law; not mere disagreement)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2003) (statutes may constitute clearly established law for certiorari purposes)
- Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1992) (trial courts must follow higher-court precedent; sister-district opinions are persuasive)
- Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1983) (departure from essential requirements of law governs certiorari scope)
- Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1995) (certiorari review narrowed to due process and correct law; substantial evidence not required)
- Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1986) (disjunctive 'or' indicates legislative intent of alternatives)
- Nader v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 4 So.3d 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (set forth two certified questions and background for certiorari review)