668 F.Supp.3d 881
N.D. Cal.2022Background
- Plaintiff Elena Nacarino purchased Chobani "Greek Yogurt Vanilla Blended" and alleges the front-label "Vanilla" and vanilla imagery led her to believe the vanilla flavor was derived independently from the vanilla plant.
- Plaintiff sued under California law (UCL unlawful prong, FAL, CLRA originally), alleging violation of FDA labeling regulations (21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i)(1)(iii)) because the product contains other natural flavors that simulate/reinforce vanilla yet does not state "with other natural flavor."
- The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s unfair/fraudulent UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims (no reasonable consumer would read the label as promising exclusively vanilla-derived flavor), but allowed the UCL unlawful-prong claim to proceed based on plausible lab-test allegations that vanillin levels suggested non-exclusive vanilla sourcing. The Court gave leave to amend limited to pleading inadequacy of legal remedies for equitable relief.
- Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) rephrasing the theory as the characterizing vanilla flavor not coming "independently" from the vanilla plant, added testing and vanillin-source allegations, and amended remedies sought.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the TAC arguing (1) inadequate pleading of inadequacy of legal remedies (Sonner), (2) lack of Article III standing for injunctive relief after In re Coca-Cola/Davidson, (3) failure to plead reliance/injury required by Kwikset, and (4) that some new TAC allegations exceed the prior leave to amend and should be stricken.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TAC plausibly alleges violation of 21 C.F.R. §101.22(i) as predicate for UCL unlawful prong | TAC alleges testing and compositional facts showing vanilla flavor is not independently derived and label lacks required disclosure | Defendant contends Plaintiff relies on strict‑liability theory and cannot base UCL relief solely on an alleged regulatory violation | Court treated prior finding that TAC plausibly alleges a regulatory violation as still supporting the unlawful‑prong claim and denied dismissal on this ground |
| Whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded reliance/injury for UCL standing (Kwikset causation) | Plaintiff alleges she read and relied on the label, believed flavor came independently from vanilla plant, paid a premium, and would not have purchased otherwise | Defendant argues the label and ingredient list belied such a belief so reliance is implausible and insufficient | Court found Plaintiff has arguably sufficiently pled actual reliance and denied dismissal for failure to plead causation |
| Whether the heightened fraud pleading rule (Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)) bars the UCL unlawful claim | Plaintiff identifies that she read and relied on specific label representations and alleges testing supporting falsity | Defendant says Plaintiff fails to plead the "who, what, when, where, how" of reliance and fraud with particularity | Court held TAC’s allegations meet Rule 9(b) at the pleading stage and denied dismissal on that basis |
| Whether Plaintiff may pursue equitable restitution (Sonner) — adequacy of legal remedy | Plaintiff alleges she lacks an adequate remedy at law because she now only asserts the UCL unlawful claim (no damages claim) and seeks restitution/disgorgement | Defendant argues Sonner requires showing an inherent limitation of legal remedies and Plaintiff cannot manufacture inadequacy by dropping damage claims or failing previously to prove damages | Court declined to resolve adequacy at pleading stage, allowing restitution claim to proceed now and reserving reassessment later |
| Article III standing for injunctive relief after In re Coca‑Cola/Davidson | Plaintiff pleads she cannot rely on labeling and would purchase the product in future only if reformulated/compliant | Defendant contends recent Ninth Circuit authority requires more than conditional or speculative intent to repurchase and thus Plaintiff lacks imminent injury | Court distinguished In re Coca‑Cola on facts, found Plaintiff’s allegation she would buy the product if reformulated sufficient for Davidson’s first scenario, and denied dismissal for lack of standing |
| Whether portions of the TAC exceed the scope of prior leave and should be struck under Rule 12(f) | Plaintiff says new allegations flow from Court’s grant of leave and Elgindy permitting alternative equitable theories | Defendant identifies multiple new factual changes beyond the limited leave to plead inadequacy and seeks to strike them | Court: some new theory‑supporting allegations (testing, vanillin source) are within scope and retained; other unrelated changes (specific package size, certain remedy wording, altered bargain‑of‑the‑benefit language) exceed leave and are struck (motion to strike granted in part) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310 (2011) (UCL standing for misrepresentation requires actual reliance as the causal link)
- Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) (equitable restitution under UCL/CLRA requires lack of an adequate remedy at law)
- Davidson v. Kimberly‑Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) (injunctive‑relief standing when consumer cannot rely on labeling in future or would repurchase only if product improved)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 377 (1992) (UCL unlawful prong "borrows" violations of other laws as predicates)
- Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., [citation="703 F. App'x 468"] (9th Cir. 2017) (Sherman Law/FDA labeling standards can supply a UCL predicate without a public‑deception requirement)